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Abstract
This Note argues that, in light of the veiws emphasized at the Cairo Conference, the population
policies of China and the United States violate women’s rights by denying women the opportunity
to make voluntary choices regarding child-bearing and fertility regulation. Part I discusses the
involvement of the United Nations with population policy-making and summarizes two U.N.-
sponsored international population policy action plans. Part II presents the population policies
of China and the United States, examines their rationales for implementation, and explains how
the policies affect women’s reproductive choices. Part III argues that the population policies of
China and the United States violate women’s right to informed choice and offers an alternate
policy solution that provides for controlled population growth with full respect for women’s right
to informed choice.
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ABSTRACT
This Article provides an in-depth analysis of the Law on the
Encouragement of Investment ("Investment Law"), recently
adopted by the Palestinian National Authority. A brief analysis
of the importance of foreign private investment to the peace
process between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation Organiza-
tion, and the progress made towards attracting such investment
in Gaza and the West Bank since the September 1993 signing of
the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Ar-
rangements, serves as a prelude to a detailed examination of the
text of the Investment Law. The author then compares the In-
vestment Law to the latest international practices and principles
on the treatment of foreign private investment. Finally, the au-
thor considers the likely impact of the Investment Law on for-
eign private investment in the Palestinian Territories and the
peace process.
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INTRODUCTION
The leaders, diplomats, and experts who have crafted the
process of building peace between Israel and the Palestine Liber-
ation Organization ("PLO") have repeatedly emphasized that
the success of this peace process depends upon the economic
development of the areas under Palestinian self-rule. Many be-
lieve that Palestinians who see no improvement in their standard
of living or find no economic opportunities as a result of the
peace process will question the wisdom of making deals with
Israel and perhaps support forces that oppose the peace process.
As a result, Israel, the PLO, and the international community
have focused attention and resources on developing the econo-
mies of Gaza and the West Bank. A key aspect of the plans for
Palestinian economic development is foreign private investment.
Recognizing of the importance of foreign private investment, in
April of 1995, the Palestinian National Authority ("PNA")
adopted the Law on the Encouragement of Investment ("Invest-
ment Law"). This Article analyzes the Investment Law and its
prospects for encouraging foreign businesses to invest in Gaza
and the West Bank (collectively, "Palestinian Territories").
I. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AD THE PEACE PROCESS
The countries and international organizations involved in
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the peace process between Israel and the PLO have given pri-
mary consideration to the economic conditions in the Palestin-
ian Territories.' The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development ("World Bank"), for example, conducted a com-
prehensive evaluation of the economic situation in the Palestin-
ian Territories prior to the signing of the Declaration of Princi-
ples on Interim Self-Government Arrangements ("Declaration") 2
by Israel and the PLO on September 13, 1993.1 In the words of
one commentator, the World Bank report "makes gloomy read-
ing."4  The World Bank identified serious infrastructure
problems with the economies of the Palestinian Territories' that
would have to be remedied through significant economic re-
form and the assistance of international aid and private invest-
ment.6 Although the World Bank recognized the need for pub-
1. Edmund O'Sullivan, Putting Palestine Back to Work, MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., Oct.
1, 1993, at 2. Edmund O'Sullivan noted that "[r]emaking the Palestinian economy is as
big a challenge for the makers of Middle East peace as reconciling Israel with its'ene-
mies. Some of the world's leading economists, every major development agency and
practically the whole of the Western world are applying themselves to this task." Id.
The importance of economic development to the peace process was recognized before
the September 1993 signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Govern-
ment Arrangements. See, e.g.,Joel C. Rosenburg, Why Economic Growth is Critical to Arab-
Israeli Peace, HERITAGE BACKGROUNDER REP., Nov. 5, 1992; Warren Strobel, U.S. Offers Aid
to Palestinians for Jobs, 'Needs', WASH. TIMES, May 5, 1993, at A7.
2. Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, Sept. 13,
1993, Isr.-PLO, 32 I.L.M. 1525 (1993) [hereinafter Declaration]. For an analysis of the
Declaration, see generally Katherine W. Meighan, The Israel-PLO Declaration of Principles:
Prelude to a Peace?, 34 VA.J. INT'L L. 435 (1994).
3. See 1-6 INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, DEVELOP-
ING THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES: AN INVESTMENT IN PEACE (1993) [hereinafter WORLD
BANK REPORT]. The World Bank Report consists of six volumes: Volume 1 Overview,
Volume 2 The Economy, Volume 3 Private Sector Development, Volume 4 Agriculture,
Volume 5 Infrastructure, and Volume 6 Human Resources and Social Policy. For a
summary of both the World Bank Report and another relevant study, Securing Peace in
the Middle East: Project on Economic Transition, which was coordinated by Harvard
University and conducted by a group of Palestinian, Jordanian, and Israeli economists,
see Allan Thompson, Rush is on to Build Palestinian Economy, TORONTO STAR, Sept. 27,
1993, at Dl. For an overview of the World Bank Report, see O'Sullivan, supra note 1, at
2.
4. O'Sullivan, supra note 1, at 3.
5. 1 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 9. For a detailed examination of the
infrastructure problems in the Palestinian Territories, see generally 5 WORLD BANK RE-
PORT, supra note 3.
6. 1 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 13. The World Bank estimated that
approximately US$2.5 billion in external public capital inflows would be required dur-
ing the five-year transition period to Palestinian self-rule. Id. at 24. For purposes of this
Article, references to "foreign private investment" and "foreign investment" mean di-
rect investment and not portfolio investment. Direct investment typically means that
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lic assistance from the international community, it emphasized
that the long-term economic viability of the Palestinian Territo-
ries would depend on the success of the private sector,7 includ-
ing foreign private investment."
The Declaration reflects the importance of economic devel-
opment in Palestinian Territories.9 Article XI of the Declaration
established an Israeli-Palestinian Economic Cooperation Com-
mittee to develop and implement economic development pro-
grams.10 Annex III of the Declaration contains a protocol on
Israeli-Palestinian cooperation on various economic and devel-
opment programs, including a Financial Development and Ac-
tion Program "for the encouragement of international invest-
ment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Israel."" In
Annex IV of the Declaration, Israel and the PLO agreed to coop-
erate in a Development Program for the region, with a specific
Economic Development Program for the Palestinian Territo-
ries. 2 The economic development and cooperation provisions
of the Declaration "indicate recognition by the two sides that the
success of their peace deal depends in large part on bringing
about an immediate tangible improvement in living standards
for Palestinians under occupation as well as mutually satisfactory
economic relations between Israel and the future Palestinian au-
thority."
13
The Conference to Support Middle East Peace, sponsored
by the United States less than a month after the signing of the
Declaration, highlighted the urgency of rebuilding the econo-
the investor has ownership and control of the assets and/or stock of the enterprise in
the foreign country.
7. 1 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 13; O'Sullivan, supra note 1, at 2.
8. "'Good policy' would include... a peace agreement that resolves strategic un-
certainty sufficiently to provide the basis for private capital inflows and investment in
productive activities . 1..." I WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 15.
9. "Israelis and Palestinians view economic interaction and growth as so critical to
long-term stability that two articles and two annexes to their Declaration of Principles
address and recognize the mutual benefit of regional economic cooperation." Daniel
Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to Encourage U.S. Enterprises to
Invest in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 405, 410 (1994) (foomote omit-
ted).
10. Declaration, supra note 2, art. XI, 32 I.L.M. at 1532.
11. Id. annex III, 32 I.L.M. at 1538.
12. Id. annex IV, 32 I.L.M. at 1540.
13. Country Report: Occupied Territories: Economic Policy and Economy, Economist In-
telligence Unit, Dec. 10, 1993, available in LEXIS, Mdeafr Library, Allmde File [herein-
after Economist Intelligence Unit].
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mies of the Palestinian Territories. At the conference, forty-
seven countries pledged approximately US$2 billion in public
assistance over a five-year period to support the transition of the
occupied territories to Palestinian self-rule. 14 A key aspect of this
promised international assistance was that such aid would be pri-
marily used to build the economic infrastructure necessary to en-
courage private investment in the Palestinian Territories."5 The
United States, for example, pledged a total of US$500 million
over the five-year period to assist the transformation of the econ-
omy in the Palestinian Territories, 16 and Vice President Al Gore
launched an initiative to spur U.S. private investment in Gaza
and the West Bank called Builders for Peace. 7 The interna-
tional community's activities indicated widespread acceptance of
the view articulated by a U.S. administration official at the Con-
ference to Support Middle East Peace: the Palestinian people
"will need to see that peace brings prosperity."' 8
14. Deborah Zabarenko, Global Meeting Set to Raise $2 Billion for Mideast, Reuters,
OcL 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Group to Promote U.S. Investment in West Bank, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1993, at A18.
18. Amy Kaslow, For Palestinians, Much is Promised, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 4,
1993, at 1. Although the argument that economic development is vital to the peace
process is frequently made, what is not often explored is the theoretical or philosophi-
cal assumptions underlying this argument. The case for Palestinian economic develop-
ment made by the World Bank and United States carries with it the assumptions and
objectives of liberal economic thought. The influence of liberal economic thinking can
be found at four levels. First, the concern that individual Palestinians need to see that
peace brings prosperity ties into the liberal economic tenet, famously expressed by
Montesquieu, of doux commerce, which holds that commerce tempers human passions
and channels them into productive, peaceful endeavors. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN,
THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS 56-66 (1977). Economic development is expected to
dissipate any discontent among Palestinians, discontent that would otherwise fester and
encourage Palestinians to embrace the ideas of radicals and extremists opposed to the
peace process. Second, the emphasis in economic development plans on private invest-
ment and market forces demonstrates that the objective is the creation of a capitalist
economy in the Palestinian Territories. The World Bank's definition of "good policy"
in the Palestinian Territories indicates that it has a capitalist model of economic devel-
opment in mind. See 1 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 15; supra note 8 (quoting
World Bank Report's definition of "good policy"). Third, the plans to promote Pales-
tinian economic development by integrating Palestinians into regional and global mar-
kets bear the imprint of the liberal belief that economic interdependence between peo-
ples and states promotes peaceful international relations. ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLTrr-
ICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 31 (1987). Fourth, the liberal economic
theory running throughout the strategy for Palestinian economic development has con-
sequences for Palestinian political development because individual freedoms necessary
to make doux commerce, the invisible hand, and peace through free trade work will re-
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II. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AFTER THE DECLARATION
The euphoria that accompanied the signing of the Declara-
tion and the holding of the Conference to Support Middle East
Peace quickly faded as the difficulty of developing the econo-
mies of the Palestinian Territories became apparent. Such diffi-
culty arose for four major reasons. First, the Declaration had not
articulated the exact nature of the rights and responsibilities of
Israel and the PLO in the economic development of the Pales-
tinian Territories. The need for rapid economic development
conflicted with the political need of both Israel and the PLO to
establish their power and authority over the wide range of polit-
ical, legal, and economic dynamics of the transition to Palestin-
ian self-rule. Second, the international aid promised by donor
countries at the Conference to Support Middle East Peace did
not flow quickly because of difficulties between the PNA and do-
nor countries. Third, foreign businesses expressed more willing-
ness to talk about investing in the Palestinian Territories than to
make investments. Finally, political violence between radical Pal-
estinian groups and Israel and political instability in the prospec-
tive areas of Palestinian self-rule had a chilling effect on foreign
businesses thinking of investing in the Palestinian Territories.
A. The Peace Process and Economic Relations
In the Declaration, Israel and the PLO agreed to establish
economic development programs for the Palestinian Territo-
ries.19 Economic development naturally touched upon the is-
sues of economic and political control, which were sensitive is-
sues for both sides. The negotiations on the transfer of political
and economic power in the Palestinian Territories leading to the
Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area
("Cairo Agreement") 20 and the Interim Agreement between
quire substantial political freedoms, like democracy. See JOSEPH CROPSEY, POLITY AND
ECONOMY. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF ADAM SMITH 95 (1957) (arguing
that Smith's position was that free political institutions are necessary to preservation of
commerce). A proper treatment of the liberal economic and political assumptions and
objectives at work in the plans for Palestinian economic development, and the propri-
ety of using liberal thought as the foundation for developing the economy of a people
with no history or experience with free market capitalism or liberal democracy, is be-
yond the scope of this Article.
19. Declaration, supra note 2, art. XI, 32 I.L.M. at 1532.
20. Israel-PLO Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area, May 4, 1994, Isr.-
PLO, 33 I.L.M. 622 [hereinafter Cairo Agreement].
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Israel and the PLO on the West Bank and Gaza Strip ("Interim
Agreement")2 1 dealt less with actual economic development
than with what the economic relations between the two sides
would be after Israel transferred authority to the PLO.22
Annex IV of the Cairo Agreement and Annex V of the In-
terim Agreement both contain the Protocol on Economic Rela-
tions between Israel and the PLO ("Economic Protocol") .21 The
Economic Protocol established the political and procedural
framework within which Israel and the PLO would work on ac-
tual economic development and, pursuant to Article XXIV of
the Interim Agreement, applies to all the Palestinian Territo-
ries. 24 Although necessary as part of the transition to Palestinian
self-rule, the negotiations on the Economic Protocol, like the ne-
gotiations on the other aspects of the Cairo Agreement and the
Interim Agreement, were lengthy and, at times, difficult.
From the perspective of a foreign investor evaluating a pos-
sible investment in the Palestinian Territories, the Economic
Protocol provides information about how the movement of
21. Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip,
Sept. 28, 1995, Isr.-PLO [hereinafter Interim Agreement] (on file with the Fordham In-
ternational Law Journal). Technically, the Interim Agreement supersedes the Cairo
Agreement. See Interim Agreement, art. XXXI(2). The author has, however, cited
both the Cairo Agreement and the Interim Agreement where possible because no cites
to an official source for the Interim Agreement can be given since, to date, it has not
been published.
22. The transfer of authority to the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") in
the peace process involves two Palestinian governmental institutions. The Declaration
called for the establishment of a Palestinian Interim Self-Government Authority (the
"Palestinian Council"), which was to be elected democratically and to have jurisdiction
over the West Bank and Gaza, except for those areas and issues subject to the perma-
nent status negotiations to take place at a later date. Declaration, supra note 2, arts. I,
II-V, 32 I.L.M. at 1527-29. The Cairo Agreement established the Palestinian National
Authority ("PNA") as an interim authority and transferred responsibility for all the leg-
islative, executive, and judicial functions in Gaza and Jericho to it. Cairo Agreement,
supra note 20, arts. III-VII, 33 I.L.M. at 627-31. The Interim Agreement stated that once
elected and inaugurated, the Palestinian Council would assume all powers and obliga-
tions transferred to the PNA under the Cairo and Interim Agreements. Interim Agree-
ment, supra note 21, art. I. This article refers throughout to the PNA; but, after the
Palestinian elections scheduled for 1996, the Palestinian Council will assume responsi-
bility for the Investment Law's implementation.
23. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, 33 I.L.M. at 696; Interim Agree-
ment, supra note 21, annex V. For a report on the Economic Protocol, see Edmund
Blair, Economic Accord Wins Mixed Reviews, MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., May 13, 1994, at 20.
For an analysis of the Economic Protocol, see generally Ephraim Kleiman, The Economic
Provisions of the Agreement Between Israel and the PLO, 28 ISRAEL L. REv. 347 (1994).
24. Interim Agreement, supra note 21, art. XXIV.
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goods, labor, and capital between Israel and the Palestinian Ter-
ritories will be treated by the two sides. Access to the Israeli mar-
ket for manufactured goods and agricultural produce originat-
ing in the Palestinian Territories is ensured by Article VIII(l)
and Article IX(l) of the Economic Protocol, which allow indus-
trial goods and agricultural produce of both sides to move freely
without customs, import taxes, or other restrictions. 25 The Eco-
nomic Protocol enshrines a strategy of close economic contact
and cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Territo-
ries.2 1 The Economic Protocol differs, however, from a tradi-
tional free trade agreement in that the Israeli import regulations
and customs tariffs shall apply both in Israel and the Palestinian
Territories, with a few specific exceptions where the PNA has the
power to set import policy. 27
Although the Economic Protocol provides that both sides
"will attempt to maintain the normality of movement of labor
between them," each side retains the right to determine "the ex-
tent and conditions of the labor movement into its area."28 As a
result, there will not be free movement of labor between Israel
and the Palestinian Territories. Because Israel has systematically
reduced the level of Palestinian employment in the Israeli econ-
25. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, arts. VIII(l), IX(l), 33 I.L.M. at
711, 715; Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, arts. VIII(l), IX(l). The Eco-
nomic Protocol contains some exceptions to the free movement of agricultural goods,
namely the application of veterinary and phytosanitary measures and quotas on certain
agricultural produce to be phased out through 1998. See Cairo Agreement, supra note
20, annex IV, art. VIII(2)-(10), 33 I.L.M. at 711-714; Interim Agreement, supra note 21,
annex V, art. VIII(2)-(10).
26. Shlomo Avineri, Sidestepping Dependency, FOREIGN AFF.,July/August 1994, at 12-
13. Shlomo Avineri observes that "[a]ll . . . assume that close Israeli-Palestinian eco-
nomic cooperation is the key to regional stability." Id.
27. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. I1(5), (10), 33 I.L.M. at 699-
700; Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. 111(5), (10). The exceptions to
the common customs policy are found in Article 111(2). Cairo Agreement, supra note
20, annex IV, art. 111(2), 33 I.L.M. at 698; Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V,
art. 111(2). A traditional free trade agreement allows each contracting party to establish
its respective customs policy vis-a-vis third parties. The Economic Protocol combines
elements of a free trade agreement and a customs union, but does not represent a
common market because labor is not allowed to move freely between the two sides.
Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. VII, 33 I.L.M. at 709; Interim Agree-
ment, supra note 21, annex V, art. VII. For a general discussion of the Economic Proto-
col in relation to free trade agreements, customs unions, and common markets, see
Kleiman, supra note 23, at 352-55.
28. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. VII(1), 33 I.L.M. at 709; In-
terim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. VII(I).
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omy 9 this "normality of movement of labor" between Israel and
the Palestinian Territories enshrined in the Economic Protocol
does not and will not create significant new employment oppor-
tunities for Palestinians in Israel. Thus, foreign investors in the
Palestinian Territories will not face competition for labor from
the Israeli economy because they will have a large pool of labor
in the Palestinian Territories to tap into without fearing labor
shortages or inflationary wage pressures caused by the Israeli la-
bor market.
A foreign investor would also want to know how authority
for taxation is divided between Israel and the PNA. The Interim
Agreement contains a Supplement to the Economic Protocol
that replaces Article V (Direct Taxation) and Article VI (Indirect
Taxes on Local Production) in the original Economic Protocol
with new articles addressing direct and indirect taxation that ap-
ply in the Palestinian Territories. ° Under Article V of the Eco-
nomic Protocol, Israel and the PNA both have independent
power to set "tax policy in matters of direct taxation, including
income tax on individuals and corporations, property taxes, mu-
nicipal taxes and fees."3' To the extent that levels of direct taxa-
tion differ greatly between Israel and the Palestinian Territories,
a foreign investor will calculate the economic impact of the tax
differential in evaluating an investment in the area.
As for indirect taxation, the PNA has the power to levy and
collect value added tax ("VAT") and purchase taxes on local pro-
duction.32 Purchase tax rates "within the jurisdiction of each tax
authority will be identical as regards locally produced and im-
ported goods."3 Additionally, the rate of Palestinian VAT can-
not be more than two percent lower than the prevailing Israeli
VAT rate. 4
29. Cherif Cordahi, Israel-Palestine: Anxious Palestinians Await "Separation" Plan, In-
ter Press Service, Mar. 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
30. See Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, Supplement, Apps. 1-2. Ap-
pendix 1 replaces Article V of the Economic Protocol, which deals with direct taxation,
while Appendix 2 supplants Article VI, dealing with indirect taxes on local production.
Id. References to Articles V and VI of the Economic Protocol in this article shall refer
to the Articles as they appear in the Supplement to the Economic Protocol in the In-
terim Agreement.
31. Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, Supplement, App. 1, art. V(1).
32. Id. annex V, Supplement, App. 2, art. VI(1).
33. Id. art. VI(2).
34. Id. art. VI(3).
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The Economic Protocol also addresses monetary and finan-
cial issues that would be important to a foreign investor. The
Economic Protocol establishes a Palestinian Monetary Authority
("PMA"), which will act as the central financial institution within
the PNA.3 5 The PMA has responsibility for acting as the PNA's
official economic and financial advisor36 and local and interna-
tional financial agent.37 The PMA will also be charged with man-
aging the PNA's foreign currency reserves,38 regulating foreign
currency exchanges in the Palestinian Territories,39 supervising
banks operating in the Palestinian Territories,40 and acting as
the lender of last resort for the banking system in the Palestinian
Territories.41 The PMA does not, however, have authority to is-
sue a Palestinian currency,42 but the new Israeli Sheqel ("NIS")
will be one of the legal currencies in the Palestinian Territo-
ries.43
The convertibility of the NIS into foreign exchange will be
of primary concern to foreign investors. Residents in the Pales-
tinian Territories will be able to exchange NIS for foreign cur-
rency but only through the PMA, which can exchange NIS for
foreign currency with the Bank of Israel" in an amount deter-
mined by a formula.45 Consequently, there will not be free con-
35. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. IV(1), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(l).
36. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. IV(2), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(2).
37. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. IV(S), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(3).
38. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. IV(4), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(4).
39. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. TV(6), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(6).
40. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex TV, art. V(7), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(7).
41. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. IV(5), 33 I.L.M. at 703; Interim
Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(5).
42. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. TV(10) (b), 33 I.L.M. at 705;
Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. TV(10) (b) (stating that "[b]oth sides
will continue to discuss..'. the possibility of introducing mutually agreed Palestinian
currency").
43. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex TV, art. IV(10) (a), 33 I.L.M. at 704;
Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IV(10) (a).
44. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20,'annex IV, art. TV(15), 33 I.L.M. at 705; In-
terim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. TV(15).
45. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. IV(16), 33 I.L.M. at 705-06;
Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. TV(16).
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vertibility of NIS in the Palestinian Territories. The convertibil-
ity of other currencies circulating in the Palestinian Territories
(e.g., the Jordanian dinar in the West Bank) will ultimately de-
pend on the foreign exchange reserves held by the PMA or on
the ability of currency holders to exchange them for hard cur-
rency elsewhere.
The complexity of the economic relationships established
by the Economic Protocol indicates that foreign investors will be
faced with a novel economic framework in the Palestinian Terri-
tories, based as much on political compromise as economic ne-
cessity. This state of affairs might itself be a source of caution for
foreign investors.
B. Flow of International Aid
Delays in the flow of aid promised by donor countries and
the World Bank at the October 1993 Conference to Support
Middle East Peace have hurt the prospects for economic devel-
opment and foreign private investment in the Palestinian Terri-
tories. The reasons for these delays are numerous, and each par-
ticipant in the aid process has blamed others for the delays.
Donor countries have withheld aid because they claimed
that the PLO failed to set up institutions and procedures to man-
age and account for the expenditure of international aid.4 6 Im-
mediately after the Conference to Support Middle East Peace,
the United States Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern
Affairs stated that the "Palestinians need to create structures to
receive and coordinate... assistance and to ensure that it is put
to productive use."4 7 Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the PLO, estab-
lished the Palestine Economic Council for Development and Re-
construction ("PECDAR")4 s by decree on October 31, 1993, to
act as the link between the PNA and the international donor
community, but the PLO took six months to staff and organize
46. Rich Donors to Provide Massive Aid to Palestinians, PREss Assoc. NEWSFILE, May 3,
1994, available in LEXIS, Mdeafr Library, Allmde File; Ruth Shalit, Honeymoon in Gaza:
Jews and Arabs Build a Five-Star Hotel, NEw REPUBLIC, Oct. 10, 1994, at 14-15.
47. Kaslow, supra note 18, at 1.
48. The PLO established the Palestine Economic Council for Development and
Reconstruction ('PECDAR") to handle the flow of aid promised by donor countries.
PECDAR's mandate is to establish development priorities for the Palestinians, coordi-
nate aid, and assist in the implementation of development projects. Economist Intelli-
gence Unit, supra note 13. PECDAR consists of a fourteen member board of directors
responsible to Arafat. Id.
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Donor countries expressed frustration at how long Arafat
took to establish and staff PECDAR.5' For example, in respond-
ing to PLO complaints about delays in aid, one U.S. official
stated that there was no one to give aid to because the PLO had
failed to create an aid infrastructure.51 In July 1994, the Council
of Ministers of the European Union expressed concern "about
the failure of the PLO to have in place appropriate structures to
enable the disbursement of funds allocated by the European
Union for assistance to the occupied territories."52 Israeli offi-
cials also expressed concern about the PLO's failure to appoint
persons to key economic and financial positions. 53  Further-
more, PECDAR came under criticism from some Palestinians
who argued that Arafat had appointed close political allies to key
positions and not professional economists and financial ex-
perts.54
Palestinian officials have denied the claims of donor coun-
tries and Israel5 5 and, in turn, the PLO has a number of criti-
cisms of the international donor community. First, the PLO be-
lieves that the aid promised at the Conference to Support Mid-
dle East Peace was insufficient to relieve the poverty of the
Palestinian Territories.56 Second, the PLO has argued that do-
nor countries have broken their promises on providing aid.57
Third, the PLO has complained about the conditions, proce-
dures, and supervision required by the international donor com-
munity before aid will flow.5"
49. Caryle Murphy, Palestinian Critics Assail Arafat's Governing Style, WASH. POST,
Sept. 27, 1994, at AIO.
50. Amy Kaslow, West Hesitates on Palestinian Aid, CHRISTIAN SCL MONITOR, May 24,
1994, at 2 [hereinafter Palestinian Aid].
51. Id.
52. Press Release 8480/94, Council of the European Union (General Affairs),
1778th Council Meeting, July 18, 1994.
53. Palestinian Aid, supra note 50, at 2.
54. Economist Intelligence Unit, supra note 13; Murphy, supra note 49, at A10.
55. Palestinian Aid, supra note 50, at 2.
56. Kaslow, supra note 18, at 1.
57. Sari Nusseibah, Deputy Director General of PECDAR, stated in May 1994 that
the donor countries have broken their aid promises: "We heard that $1.2 billion was to
be spent the first year, but some of it was supposed to be spent in 1994. It has not been
spent. Not one single penny of it. We hear a lot of excuses." Palestinian Aid, supra
note 50, at 2.
58. See, e.g., Youssef M. Ibrahim, PLO Wants Aid Funds, Fast; But It Says Donors' Su-
pervision is Humiliating, lcr'L HERALD TRIB., June 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis
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The Israelis have likewise been criticized for contributing to
the delay in the flow of aid. The border closings imposed by,
Israel following terrorist attacks on Israelis created economic
hardship in the Palestinian Territories and contributed to the
political instability in the Palestinian community. 59 The political
turmoil within the Palestinian community has forced the PLO to
concentrate its attention on keeping the political situation from
exploding rather than on economic development. If the PLO
has in fact been slow to create the infrastructure needed for the
receipt and disbursement of aid, then such slowness reflects the
urgency and importance of the political issues that the PLO
deals with daily. The political violence resulting from this tur-
moil has been particularly inhibiting to the flow of aid because
donor countries have been hesitant to release billions of dollars
of aid into an area, at times, approaching civil war.60 Finally,
Israeli bureaucracy and red tape were also cited for contributing
to the stagnant economic conditions in the Palestinian Territo-
ries.6
1
The World Bank and donor countries have not withheld all
aid funds, 62 instead a pattern emerged in which donor countries
and the World Bank would agree to release limited funds to help
the PNA through a crisis. For example, in May 1994, eight
months after the signing of the Declaration, the World Bank
launched a US$1.2 billion, three-year emergency aid plan for the
West Bank and Gaza.63 In December 1994, donor countries and
the World Bank agreed to give the PNA US$200 million to pay
public workers, create construction jobs, and begin infrastruc-
Library, Curnws File (discussing strict oversight by donor countries); Roger Matthews,
Aid Pledges of 2.4bn Leave PLO with a Cash Shortfalk" Donors' Stance is Angering Arafat, FIN.
TIMEs, July 1, 1994, at 6 (discussing Arafat's concern with donors' refusal to deliver on
pledges).
59. Nathaniel C. Nash, Donors Grant Arafat $200 Million to Tide Him Over in Gaza,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 1994, at A9. "The unemployment caused by the border closings is
seen as a major contributor to political unrest in Gaza." Id.
60. SeeJill Hamburg, Massacre Slows Business; But West Bank Deals Will Survive, Many
Say, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 6, 1994, at 1A (discussing affect of violence on Pales-
tinian economic development).
61. See John West, West Bank, Gaza Investment Trickles Through Israeli Red Tape,
Reuters World Service, Apr. 26, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
62. Joel Greenberg, International Aid for Palestinians Falters, INr'L HERALD T~iB.,
Mar. 14, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. For example, of the
US$800 million pledged for 1994, only US$228 million was actually delivered to the
PNA. Id.
63. Rich Donors to Provide Massive Aid to Palestinians, supra note 46.
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ture improvement projects." In March 1995, the United States
pledged US$65 million in grants to the PNA.65 The ad hoc, crisis
delivery of the aid, compared against the grand promises made
at the Conference to Support Middle East Peace and the need
for systematic reconstruction of economic infrastructure in the
Palestinian Territories, gives potential foreign investors the sense
that the international aid program for the Palestinians is, and
will remain, a troubled and troubling endeavor.66
The multiple causes for the delays in the flow of aid and the
continuing political friction caused by such delays has created
further disincentives for private investors. This controversy: (1)
suggests that the PNA had not yet put its economic house in
order; (2) indicates that donor countries are losing their enthu-
siasm for economic development projects in Gaza and the West
Bank; (3) demonstrates that Israeli security concerns and eco-
nomic dominance in the region place limits on the process of
Palestinian economic development; and (4) hampers the build-
ing of the infrastructure needed to attract and support private
investment. The interdependence between public aid and pri-
vate investment, identified by the World Bank and the donor
countries as the key dynamic of economic development for Gaza
and the West Bank, has not yet been established.67
C. Attitudes of Foreign Private Investors
Since the signing of the Declaration, the general attitude
among foreign businesses towards investing in the Palestinian
Territories has been one of cautious interest, with the caution
outweighing the interest. The signing of the Declaration trig-
64. Nash, supra note 59, at A9.
65. Storer H. Rowley, Arafat Bolstered by Gift from U.S.; Gore Pledges $65 Million in
Grants, CHI. TUB., Mar. 25, 1995, at 3.
66. See Greenberg, supra note 62.
67. James Zogby, Co-President of Builders for Peace, stated on July 13, 1995, that
"[v]irtual reality projections from international bureaucrats aside, not one single major
job creating infrastructure project has begun." Economic Development and U.S. Assistance
in Gaza/Jericho, 1995: Hearing before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asian Affairs of
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (testimony of'James
Zogby, Mel Levine, Ziad Karram, Margaret Carpenter, Richard Roth, Christopher Finn,
Senator Hank Brown) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File [hereinafter Hear-
ings]. Joe DeSutter, Executive Director of Builders for Peace, stated in November 1995
that "[t]here is no evidence of the infrastructure to which the international donor com-
munity pledged $2.5 billion." Esther Hecht, Halted in Its Tracks?,J ERUSALEM POST, Nov.
10, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (quotingJoe DeSutter).
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gered interest in the Palestinian Territories amongst many in the
international business community. In some cases, this interest
translated into actual investment projects. For example, in Sep-
tember 1994, Vice President Gore and Builders for Peace jointly
announced nine investment projects in the Palestinian Territo-
ries.6 8 The fanfare that accompanied the Builders for Peace an-
nouncement has, however, been replaced by a drought in pri-
vate investment interest in the United States towards the Pales-
tinian Territories. In testimony, in July 1995, on economic
development in Gaza and Jericho before the Subcommittee on
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs of the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Mel Levine, Co-President of Builders for
Peace, expressed his frustration at the current state of private
investment in the Palestinian Territories:
Since everyone recognizes the political urgency of private sec-
tor development, and since the raw material for such develop-
ment is at hand, why is Pete Bucheit's impressive concrete
plan in Gaza the only new Palestinian business we have been
able to create in the year-and-a-half of our existence?6 9
68. See BREAKTHROUGH! Builders for Peace Announces First Projects, BUILDING
BLOCKS (Builders for Peace, Washington, D.C.), Sept. 1994, at 1 (celebrating announce-
ment of first investment projects in Palestinian Territories); Ray Delgado, Nonprofit
Group Builders for Peace Has Announced Nine Business Ventures in Gaza and the West Bank,
LA. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1994, at D5 (discussing Builders for Peace projects). The nine
announced projects were: (1) construction of furniture and mattress factories by
AMTEC International; (2) construction of condominiums by AMTEC International; (3)
formation of bottled water company by ASTRUM International in conjunction with its
subsidiary Culligan International Co.; (4) creation of a cement manufacturing plant by
Bucheit International; (5) construction of two motel/business centers by SAFA Interna-
tional; (6) construction of ten deluxe condominiums by I.B. Cook Investments; (7)
construction of Marriott Hotel in Gaza by GRdG; (8) construction of olive oil packaging
and storage facility by West Bank and Gaza Development and Kramer Associates; and
(9) construction of processing plant for crude oil and sale of byproducts like asphalt
and establishment of service stations by Palestinian Fuels Co. SeeJohn S. McClenahen,
In the Middle East, Too, It's 'Hey, Culligan Man', INDUSTRY WK., OCL 17, 1994, at 21; see
also Michael Schneider, Utah Man Pushing Palestinian Refinery, PLATr'S OILGRAM NEWS,
Oct. 24, 1994, at 1 (discussing possible construction of oil processing plant). See gener-
ally BUILDING BLOCKS, supra, at 4 (listing all nine projects).
69. Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of Mel Levine). On the success of the ce-
ment plant, see Leisel Bucheit, How We Opened a Factory in Gaza, BUILDING BLOCKS
(Builders for Peace, Washington, D.C.), May/June 1995, at 1. In early 1994, Culligan
International Co. donated a water purification system to the Bethlehem Arab Society
for Rehabilitation Hospital, a donation that "was touted as the first private American
investment in the West Bank and Gaza as part of the Clinton Administration's Builders
for Peace program." McClenahen, supra note 68, at 21. The Culligan donation was
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Moreover, Mr. Levine directed much of his July 1995 testimony
to explaining the obstacles that the Overseas Private Insurance
Corporation ("OPIC"), a U.S. Government agency,70 was creat-
ing for the flagship investment project for Builders for Peace-
the Gaza Marriott Hotel.71
Four specific factors combined to make private investors
hesitate to invest money in Gaza or the West Bank. First and
foremost, the political violence that followed the Declaration
and the Cairo Agreement between radical Palestinians and the
PLO and Israel created an unstable political environment for
private investors. 72 Border closings by Israel in response to ter-
rorist acts disrupted economic conditions in Gaza and the West
Bank, further delaying the creation of a stable environment for
private investors. 7' Further, the violence within the Palestinian
community threatened to escalate into civil war between the
PLO and other radical Palestinian groups, like Hamas. 4 A key
aspect of the intra-Palestinian conflict has been the failure to ful-
fill promises of economic development. The New York Times re-
ported the participants in the peace process sensing "that vast
unemployment, declining economic activity and falling living
standards in Gaza were adding to anti-Arafat sentiment and ex-
panding the number of sympathizers of the fundamentalist
Hamas organization." 75 Private investors need peace to make
not, however, the creation of a new business. Rather, the donation was a contribution
to an existing project. Id.
70. Overseas Private Insurance Corporation's ("OPIC") mission is to "mobilize and
facilitate the participation of United States private capital and skills in the economic
and social development of less developed countries and areas, and countries in transi-
tion from nonmarket to market economies, thereby complementing the development
assistance objectives of the United States." 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191 (West Supp. 1995). For
the legislation establishing and governing OPIC, see 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191 et. seq. (West
Supp. 1995). The regulations for OPIC can be found at 22 C.F.R. §§ 705-12 (1995).
71. See Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of Mel Levine).
72. Hamburg, supra note 60, at 1A.
73. Nash, supra note 59, at A9.
74. "Fears of a brewing civil war have virtually drowned already dim hopes that
Gaza will attract anything more than charity funding in the foreseeable future." Norma
Greenaway, Fears of Civil War Scaring Off Economic Investment in Gaza, VANCOUVER SUN,
Nov. 25, 1994, at A19.
75. Nash, supra note 59, atA9. Mr. Levine stated in his Senate testimony that "[a]s
the literature on political development makes clear, it is not oppression that brings
instability Mr. Chairman; it is the systemic failure to fulfill rising expectations." Hear-
ings, supra note 67 (testimony of Mel Levine). For a general treatment of fundamental-
ism in the Palestinian Territories, see generally ZIAD ABU-AMR, ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (1994).
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profits, and many do not see enough peace in the Palestinian
Territories to warrant taking business and financial risks.76
Second, investment in the Palestinian Territories seemed
risky because the PNA had not created institutions and proce-
dures readily comprehensible to the international business com-
munity. The controversy over the creation and composition of
PECDAR and the handling of aid funds had parallels on the pri-
vate investment front. For example, although foreign private in-
vestment was considered by all parties to the peace process as
critical to its success, the PNA did not adopt a foreign investment
law until April 1995.17 Before the Investment Law was adopted,
how a foreign investor was to structure an investment, to whom
the investment proposal should be made, and how the invest-
ment would be treated by the PNA in the future remained sub-
ject to ad hoc decisions and agreements absent any transparency
or predictability. Investors, according to the Washington Post,
have been "put off by Arafat's insistence on personally approving
all new projects."7" In such an environment, stories like Arafat's
handling of the contract to develop the Palestinian telephone
system, in which Arafat essentially awarded an exclusive contract
to two different companies while continuing to negotiate with a
76. See Hamburg, supra note 60, at 1A, Deborah Horan, Businessmen Wary of Invest-
ing in Strip of Instability, Inter Press Service, May 30, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Curnws File.
77. Horan, supra note 76. Why the Palestinians took so long to adopt the foreign
investment law is not clear. In early February 1994, a high ranking PLO official was
quoted as stating "[w]e have prepared an investment law." PLO Official Discusses Needs of
Palestinian Economy, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 1, 1994, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. In November 1994, at the first Middle East and
North Africa Economic Summit in Casablanca, a prospective investor confronted a
high-ranking PNA official by asking: "Have you passed an investment law yet ? I've
been trying to invest in Palestine for months but there's no legal structure to do it yet."
Ethan Bronner, Mideast Summit Spurred Trade - In Business Cards, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
2, 1994, at 17 (providing quote by investor). The PNA official responded by saying an
investment law would take effect later in November 1994. Id. In December 1994, an-
other high-ranking PNA official discussed the investment law, stating that it "provided
complete guarantees for capital invested inside Palestinian territory." Finance Minister
Discusses Israeli Obstacles, Development Projects, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Dec.
20, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Yet in February 1995, one year
after a PLO official said the PLO had prepared an investment law, Nejla Sammakia
reported the "lack of clear investment laws has so far kept businessmen away from Pales-
tinian autonomous areas of Gaza and Jericho." Nejla Sammakia, PLO Hopes Egypt Can
Boost Faltering Gaza-Jericho Economy, Agence France Presse, Feb. 5, 1995, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
78. Murphy, supra note 49, at A10.
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third, did little to bolster the foreign business community's con-
fidence in dealing with the PNA.79 In addition to concerns
about Arafat's and the PNA's performance on investment mat-
ters is the larger issue about the nature of Palestinian self-rule:
whether the Palestinians would enjoy democracy or suffer a dic-
tatorship.80 If the PNA emerges as an undemocratic entity, then
foreign private investors might consider the Palestinian Territo-
ries more politically and commercially risky.
Third, the peace process has opened economic opportuni-
ties in Israel and Jordan, two well-established states with the abil-
ity to absorb international investment effectively. The business
conferences held in Casablanca, Amman, and Jerusalem in 1994
and 1995 focused on the economic opportunities opening up in
the region because of Israel's peace deals with the PLO and with
Jordan.81 The stability of Israel, its history of friendly relations
with the democratic West, and its economic dominance in the
region make it a safe investment location when compared to the
truncated, poverty-ridden, and tumultuous Palestinian Territo-
ries.8 2 Trade and investment with Israel may become even more
79. See Robert S. Greenberger & Amy Dockser Marcus, Arafat's Operators: Unlikely
Paris Duo Advises Palestinians on Development Deals, WALL ST. J., Feb. 2, 1995, at Al. For
further information on dissatisfaction with Arafat's overall governing style, see Murphy,
supra note 49, at A10.
80. Compare William B. Quant, The Urge for Democracy, FOREIGN Arr., July/August
1994, at 2 with Amos Perlmutter, Arafat's Police State, FOREIGN A".,July/Aug. 1994, at 8.
The Interim Agreement creates the framework for Palestinian democracy by providing
for democratic elections of the Palestinian Council and the Chairman of the Executive
Authority of the Palestinian Council. See Interim Agreement, supra note 21, art. II,
annex II.
81. Bob Hepburn, Mideast Bonanza May Be Just a Desert Mirage; Private Investors Still
See the Middle East as Risky for Business, TORONTO STAR, Nov. 6, 1994, at C5. "Huge busi-
ness conferences in Casablanca, Jerusalem, and Amman are the new symbol of the Mid-
dle East and the Arab world, staged to allow government and business leaders to seek
ways to turn the recent Israel peace deals with Jordan and the Palestine Liberation
Organization into regional economic miracles." Id. On the latest of these business
conferences, see generally Middle East Summit: Public Ventures, Private Doubts, ECONO-
MIST, Nov. 4, 1995, at 48 (reporting on second Middle East and North Africa economic
summit in Amman).
82. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Mideast Accord: The Economy; Israelis Expect Peace in Mideast
Would Bring Big Dividends, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1993, at A17; Suzanne L. MacLachlan,
Israel Draws U.S. Investors Despite Faltering Peace Process, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 5,
1994, at 9; Julian Ozanne, British Companies Take a Fresh Look at Israel-The Peace Process
Has Brought a Growing Interest in Middle East Opportunities, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 16, 1995, at 8;
Deborah Horan & Cherif Cordahi, Israel-Economy: Growth, Growth and More Growth, and
More to Come, Inter Press Service, June 19, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Curnws File; Foreign Investment in Israel Could Grow to $3Bln, Reuters, July 4, 1995, avail-
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attractive if the Arab nations continue to ease their primary, sec-
ondary, and tertiary boycotts of Israel. s
For foreign investors, the U.S.-Israel Free Trade Agreement
("Israel FTA") makes Israel even more attractive as a place to
invest productive capacity because of the preferential treatment
Israel-origin exports get in the United States. 4 When Gaza and
the West Bank were under Israeli occupation, many products
produced there benefitted from the Israel FTA because they
were marked "Made in Israel" and transshipped via Israel to the
United States.85 The U.S. Customs Service has, however, put an
end to this treatment of goods from the West Bank and Gaza by
requiring that products from these regions imported into the
United States must be marked either "Made in Gaza" or "Made
in the West Bank." 86
Goods from the West Bank and Gaza will no longer benefit
from the preferential tariffs available to Israel-origin products
under the Israel FTA. Although the United States has extended
preferential tariff treatment to goods from the West Bank and
Gaza under the U.S. General System of Preferences 87 ("GSP"),
Palestinian officials disputed that GSP treatment would provide
benefits to the fledgling economy of the Palestinian Territories
in the short-term because the product areas where Palestinians
can currently export effectively, namely food and textiles, are ex-
cluded from GSP treatment.88 The United States eventually rec-
ognized the disadvantages the Palestinian Territories would face
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. But see Foreign Investment in Israel Falls in 1994,
Reuters, Feb. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File.
83. See Elaine Sciolino, Saudis and 5 Other Gulf Nations Will Ease Their Boycott of
Israel, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 1994, at 1 (pointing out that long-standing boycotts are eas-
ing); Israel Says Lifting Boycott Will Boost Its Economy, Reuters Eur. Bus. Rep., Oct. 1, 1994,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File (commenting on economic benefits of
ending boycotts). For a brief overview of the Arab boycott of Israel, see 3 WORLD BANK
REPORT, supra note 3, at 58-59. In negotiations on a U.S.-Palestinian free trade agree-
ment, the PNA agreed to work towards getting Arab states to lift their boycott of Israel.
Kantor Sets Free Trade Deal With Palestinians, Reuters, Oct. 17, 1995, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
84. United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 22, 1985, U.S.-Isr., 24 I.L.M.
653, H.R. Doc. No. 61, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) [hereinafter Israel FTA].
85. See New Marking for West Bank, Gaza Goods Omits Palestinian Goods from IsraelFTA,
INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) at 874 (May 18, 1995) [hereinafter New Marking for West Bank].
86. See Country of Origin Marking of Products from the West Bank and Gaza, 60 Fed.
Reg. 17,607 (1995).
87. Proclamation 6778, 60 Fed. Reg. 15,455 (1995).
88. New Marking for West Bank, supra note 85, at 874.
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if goods from the Territories were treated less favorably than
goods from Israel upon importation into the United States and
in October 1995, the United States and the PNA took the first
steps towards the creation of a U.S.-Palestinian free trade agree-
ment under which the United States will not impose customs du-
ties on Palestinian goods.89 This U.S.-Palestinian free trade
agreement will eliminate the tariff advantage Israeli goods had
over Palestinian goods under the Israel FTA.90
Another incentive to invest in either Israel or Jordan as op-
posed to Palestinian Territories is provided by the legal stability
available in Israel and Jordan. The state of commercial law in
Gaza and the West Bank is far more confusing and intimidating
to a foreign investor than Israeli orJordanian commercial law.9 '
For example, Gaza and the West Bank have different legal sys-
tems because of their different historical experiences and influ-
89. Kantor Sets Free Trade Deal with Palestinians, supra note 83.
90. The PNA claims that it also has concluded a trade agreement with Jordan and
is negotiating other trade agreements with Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, Tunisia, and the
United Arab Emirates. PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, 2 INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAWS
& REGULATION 26 (1995) [hereinafter INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAws].
91. See 3 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 4 (noting that Palestinians "are
governed by a legal and administrative system that is antiquated, imposes disproportion-
ate regulatory burdens, and does not provide adequate or stable, predictable rules for
property rights definition and transfer"). On the issue of property rights, see generally
Eyal Benvenisti & Eyal Zamir, Private Claims to Property Rights in the Future Israel-Palestin-
ian Settlement, 89 Am. J. INT'L L. 295 (1995). James Zogby, Co-President of Builders for
Peace, has cited the lack of a coherent legal and commercial code as a problem con-
fronting private investment. Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of James Zogby). Re-
sources on international aspects of Israeli and Jordanian commercial law are, on the
other hand, readily available for business persons and their counsel to analyze. For
Israeli commercial law, see, for example: Shlomo Peled, The Commercial Laws of Israel, in
IV DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD (1993); COMMERCIAL AGENCIES AND DIS
TRIBUTORSHIPS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE IS-1 (Adam Fremantle ed., 1994); Moshe
Goldberg, International Joint Ventures in Israel, in JOINT VENTURES WITH INTERNATIONAL
PARTNERS 6-1 (James A. Dolkin & Jeffrey A. Burt eds., 1989); Yigal Arnon & Orna Sas-
son, Agency and Distribution Agreements in Israel, in INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND DISTRiBU-
TION AGREEMENTS Isr-1 (Thomas F. Clasen ed., 1990). Concerning Jordanian commer-
cial law, see Dr. Hamzeh Haddad, Agency and Distribution Agreements in Jordan, in INTER-
NATIONAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS Jor-1 (Thomas F. Clasen ed., 1989);
COMMERCIAL AGENCIES AND DISTRIBUTORSHIPS: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE JO-1 (Adam
Fremantle ed., 1993). The World Bank is sponsoring a compilation of the existing com-
mercial laws in the Palestinian Territories for foreign businesses. David P. Fidler, Draft-
ing a Sales Representative Agreement for Palestine: Political and Legal Considerations, INT'L
CONT. ADVISER, Summer 1995, 3, 13. Mazen E. Qupty & Associates, a Palestinian law
firm, published in October 1995 a short legal guide to doing business in the Palestinian
Territories. See MAZEN E. QUPTY & ASSOCIATES, LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN
PALESTINE (1995) [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN PALESTINE].
550 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:529
ences. Gazan law is a mixture of Ottoman and British law, Egyp-
tian military orders, and Israeli military law, while the West
Bank's system of law is influenced more heavily by the Jordanian
legal system as modified by Israeli military orders.92 The differ-
ences between the commercial laws of the two Palestinian Terri-
tories are complicated by the lack of transparency in those legal
systems. Additionally, the commercial law that does exist must
be updated to reflect contemporary international practice."
Navigating the existing legal labyrinth might prove an expensive
process for foreign companies.94
92. R. Joseph DeSutter & Keith Molkner, A Review of Palestinian Legal Practices,
BUILDING BLOCKS (Builders for Peace, Washington, D.C.), July/Sept. 1995, at 1. For a
discussion of the development of the legal systems in the Palestinian Territories, see
Anis F. Kassim, Legal Systems and Developments in Palestine, I PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 19
(1984). For an analysis of the legal regime applying to foreign investment in the Pales-
tinian Territories before the Investment Law, see generally Keith Molkner & Ra'ed Ab-
dul Hamid, The Legal Structure for Foreign Investment in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 1
IPCRI Law & DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM COMMERCIAL LAW REPORTS (Israel/Palestine
Center for Research and Information, London), Oct. 1994.
93. Anis M. AI-Qasem, head of the PNA's High Legal Commission, has stated that
Palestinians
[H]ave to review the existing legal situation-the situation prior to Israeli oc-
cupation-to find out what legislation has to be repealed, up-dated, or uni-
fied. Most of the basic legislation was left undeveloped. For example, in the
Gaza Strip, the company [corporate] law is an old 1929 [statute]. And be-
tween 1929 and the present, jurisprudence has developed considerably.
Gary A. Hengstler, First Steps Towards Justice, 80 A.B.A.J. 52, 54 (1994) (quoting Anis Al-
Qasem). The legislative challenge will be to modernize the legal system to protect in-
vestments while, at the same time, leaders are seeking investments. The World Bank
concluded that "priority attention should be focused on the modernization and harmo-
nization of the legal framework for business activities and property rights disposition."
3 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 15. The importance of the domestic legal
regime to foreign private investment has been analyzed in the context of Central and
Eastern Europe. Cheryl W. Gray & William W. Jarosz, Law and the Regulation of Foreign
Direct Investment: The Experience from Central and Eastern Europe, 33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1 (1995). Gray andJarosz argue that a domestic legal system can affect foreign inves-
tors in three ways: (1) by altering the prices for capital, labor, or technology; (2) by
altering transaction costs; and (3) by determining the types and amounts of risks that
foreign investors must bear. Id. at 12. The current condition of Palestinian commercial
law could be seen as increasing a foreign investor's ex ante and ex post transaction costs
by creating uncertainty in the establishment of an investment, the operation of the
investment, and the enforcement of legal rights. See id. at 13 (discussing different types
of transactions costs). The legal uncertainty in Palestinian commerce also increases the
risks a foreign investor must take, thus raising the costs of the investment. See id. at 13-
14 (discussing effect of given legal regime on risk allocation).
94. See, e.g., Fidler, supra note 91, at 5 (describing one account of attempt to put
together transaction between American company and Palestinian individual that in-
cluded difficulties finding out state of law in Gaza). Builders for Peace and the Palestin-
ian law firm of Mazen E. Qupty & Associates maintain that many of the concerns and
INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE
While it is not true that a legal vacuum exists in the Palestin-
ian Territories, the need for harmonization and modernization
in Palestinian commercial law creates psychological barriers as
well as strictly legal problems for foreign investors. 95 Foreign
businesses pondering the legal framework for investment in the
Palestinian Territories are not comforted by stories like the one
about the US$200 million Palestinian investment company that
was established to tap money from the Palestinian diaspora to
invest in the Palestinian Territories, but was registered in Liberia
because of uncertainty over the legal status of companies in the
West Bank.96 The nature of the existing system of Palestinian
commercial law, combined with concerns about the perform-
ance of the PNA on commercial issues, provides disincentives to
foreign investors.
The presence in Israel and Jordan of established banking
systems also makes them more attractive for investment than the
Palestinian Territories. Since the 1967 occupation by Israel of
the West Bank and Gaza, "the Palestinian economy has lacked
banking services."97 Banks that have opened in the West Bank
since the Declaration are mainly transferring deposits to Jordan
where there are better investment opportunities. 9 One Palestin-
ian economist estimates that as much as US$500 million has
been transferred out of the Palestinian Territories.99 Addition-
ally, some Palestinian business persons prefer to do their bank-
ing with Israeli banks because of the undeveloped banking sys-
fears about commercial law in Gaza and the West Bank, however, are exaggerated. See
DeSutter & Molkner, supra note 92, at 1 (discussing weaknesses in commercial law in
Gaza and West Bank); LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN PALESTINE, supra note 91, at
80 (stating desire to "dispel the myth that business entities in Gaza and the West Bank
operate at their peril within a legal vacuum").
95. See 1 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 17 (noting that "[d]espite some
improvement in the recent past, there remains a widespread perception among OT
[occupied territories] entrepreneurs that the current business environment is ambigu-
ous, complex, and unpredictable.").
96. See Suleiman al-Khalidi, Palestinians Set Up $200 Million Holding Company,
Reuters, Mar. 23, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuters File (reporting that
holding company was registered in Liberia).
97. Amy Dockser Marcus, Banks Frustrate West Bank Palestinians, WALL Sr.J.,July 18,
1995, at Al; 3 WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, at 71. For detailed information on
the financial sector in the Palestinian Territories, including the banking system, see 3
WORLD BANK REPORT, supra note 3, annex III, at 70-106.
98. Marcus, supra note 97, at A9.
99. Id.
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tem in the Palestinian Territories."'0 Although the PMA is tak-
ing steps to increase local investment of bank deposit funds, 10 1
the poor condition of the Palestinian economy will continue to
hamper the development of a Palestinian banking system.
Fourth, the most visible American investment effort, the
Gaza Marriott Hotel,0 2 has been frustrated by the reluctance of
OPIC to provide loans for this project despite issuing a protocol
to support it.10 3  On September 12, 1994, OPIC publicly an-
nounced that five of the nine Builders for Peace investment
projects would receive U.S. Government financing and insur-
ance under an agreement signed between the PLO and OPIC.10 4
OPIC pledged to provide US$125 million to American compa-
nies investing in the West Bank and Gaza, US$50 million of
which would go to support five of the Builders for Peace
projects, including the Gaza Marriott Hotel. 10 OPIC has not,
however, provided any funds to the parties planning to build the
Gaza Marriott Hotel. According to Ziad Karram, President and
Chief Executive Officer of GRdG, "OPIC's criteria have been in
a constant state of change" since October 1994.106 OPIC's be-
havior caught the attention of U.S. Senator Hank Brown, Chair-
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Gaza Marriott Hotel "project is a high priority for anyone associated with
the effort to stimulate the Palestinian economy." See Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony
of Mel Levine).
103. See id. (providing Mel Levine's testimony on OPIC). Mr. Levine told the Sub-
committee about the "intense international focus" on the building of the Gaza Marriott
Hotel, suggesting that this project was viewed by many as the litmus test for U.S. support
of Palestinian economic development. Id. See also Peter F. Sisler, Gaza Marriott Hotel
Project in Jeopardy, UPI, July 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File
(discussing problems with Gaza Marriott project).
104. Overseas Private Investment Corporation Signs Historic Palestinian Agreement, OPIC
Press Release, Sept. 12, 1994.
105. Id.
106. Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of Ziad Karram). GRdG has developed
Marriott hotels in the United States and is taking the lead role in the development of
the Gaza Marriott Hotel. Hecht, supra note 67. Mel Levine of Builders for Peace sup-
ports Mr. Karram's view that OPIC has been changing the criteria under which it would
provide loan funding. In his testimony Mr. Levine stated:
OPIC's requirements since then [September 1994] have included increases in
equity, adjustments in equity distribution, shortened amortization schedules
than we had anticipated, substantial debt reserves, operating reserves, OPIC
fees, and OPIC profits. Mr. Karram met each of these evolving terms in good
faith. He has now accepted 25 of the 26 terms the OPIC staff put in writing
about a month ago, and can even meet them half way on the 26th.
Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of Mel Levine).
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man of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs, who called hearings to examine
economic development in the Palestinian Territories on July 13,
1995.17 While the details of the dispute between the Gaza Mar-
riott Hotel project and OPIC are beyond the scope of this Arti-
cle,"'8 OPIC's reluctance to fulfill commitments that were pub-
licly made has cast a shadow over the commitment of the U.S.
Government to economic development in the Palestinian Terri-
tories. Other countries and their business communities, no
doubt, are taking note of the confused signals from Washington,
D.C. on support for private investment in the Palestinian Territo-
ries.
III. ANALYSIS OF INVESTMENT LAW
This part of the Article analyzes the official English-lan-
guage translation of the official Arabic text of the Investment
107. The individuals testifying before the Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs on July 13, 1995, were: Mel Levine, Co-President of Builders for
Peace; Ziad Karram, President and CEO of GRdG; James Zogby, Co-President of Build-
ers for Peace and President of the Arab American Institute; Margaret Carpenter, Assis-
tant Administrator for the Agency for International Development; Richard Roth, Direc-
tor of the Office of Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs; and Christopher Finn, Executive Vice
President of OPIC. See Hearings, supra note 67.
108. Apparently, the sticking point between the Gaza Marriott Hotel project and
OPIC is over OPIC's insistence on an "operational completion guarantee" from the
project participants equal to $14.4 million, which is 20% of the project's estimated cost
but 40% of the proposed loan amount of $36 million. See Hearings, supra note 67 (testi-
mony of Ziad Karram). According to Mr. Karram, OPIC informed GRdG on July 11,
1995, that the $14.4 million operational completion guarantee was not negotiable. Id.
Two days later, Senator Brown called hearings on economic development in the Pales-
tinian Territories before the Senate Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs. In his testimony, Mr. Karram expressed his disbelief and frustration at OPIC's
behavior:
If such an absolute minimum criterion was so well established, why were we
not told about it until June 15[, 1995]? Since this is a 'deal breaker' why were
we not told about this from the beginning? Why were we not told about it
before the announcement at the White House on September 12, 1994? Why
were we not told before Chairman Arafat announced the project to the Pales-
tinian people and to the world? Why were we not told before we spent over $1
million on this project? And why were we not told before we put our credibil-
ity on the line assuring that this project would be built?... We are apparently
being penalized through the completion guarantee requirement because this
project is in Gaza and the political risk is being converted to a business risk as
earlier admitted by OPIC.
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Law, which is provided as an appendix to this Article.1"9 The
analysis outlines the provisions of the Investment Law and exam-
ines questions, ambiguities, and problems that arise from a read-
ing of the text."10
A. Definitions of Investor, Investment and Other Terms
1. Investor
The Investment Law, in Article 1, defines "Investor" to
mean "any natural or legal person seeking or offering to invest
in Palestine."" The application of the Investment Law to all
potential investors in the Palestinian Territories makes the In-
vestment Law comprehensive in that respect. This comprehen-
sive approach to potential investors represents the first indica-
tion that the PNA seeks to treat all investors in a non-discrimina-
tory manner - a principle expressly stated in Article 18.2 of the
Investment Law.1 2 One question raised by this definition, how-
ever, is whether it encompasses both Palestinian and foreign in-
vestors. Although other provisions in the Investment Law make
it clear that the Investment Law applies to foreign as well as Pal-
109. Law on the Encouragement of Investment [hereinafter Investment Law].
The full text of the Law on the Encouragement of Investment ("Investment Law") is set
forth in the Appendix to this Article, which begins on page 603. 'The Appendix consists
of the official PNA English-language translation of the official Arabic text, but this
translation has not yet been published. This translation is in many places awkward or
not clear. The author has therefore made some minor grammatical, stylistic, and orga-
nizational clarifications to improve the readability of the Appendix. The author made
no changes that would affect the substance or meaning of the Investment Law. In ana-
lyzing the Official Translation, the author has been helped tremendously by separate
translations provided by IPCRI ("IPCRI Translation") and Zora O'Neill of the Near
Eastern Languages and Cultures Department at Indiana University (Bloomington)
("O'Neill Translation"). The author also referred to an English translation of an earlier
draft of the Investment Law provided to the author by Builders for Peace ("Draft Trans-
lation"). The IPCRI Translation, O'Neill Translation, and the Draft Translation are on
file with the author and with the Fordham International Law Journal.
110. The PNA has published an official summary of the Investment Law that is very
brief. See INVEsr IN PALESTINE: LAws, supra note 90, at 11-12. INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAWS
was one volume of a four volume publication used by the PNA to attract investment at
the second Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit in Amman, Jordan at the
beginning of November 1995. See 1-4 PALESTINIAN NATIONAL AUTHORITY, INVEST IN PAL.
ESTINE (1995). Another brief summary of the Investment Law can be found in LEGAL
ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN PALESTINE, supra note 91, at 28-31.
111. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 1, Appendix at 603.
112. Id. art. 18.2, Appendix at 608-09.
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estinian investors, 113 Article 1 could have made this explicit in its
definition of "Investor."" 4
2. Investment
The Investment Law, in Article 1, defines "Investment" as
the "creation or addition of economic activities (production, in-
dustrial, tourist, agricultural, medical, educational, productive,
construction services) in Palestine, including: (a) establishing
new projects; [and] (b) adding new schemes of production and
new machinery which results in increasing employment and pro-
duction." ' It is not clear from this definition whether the In-
vestment Law provides a comprehensive regime for all types of
investments. First, it is not clear whether the Investment Law
applies to investments in the service sector of the economy. The
official translation reads "productive, construction services," and
one interpretation of this phrase is that only investments in serv-
ices directly related to production fall within the scope of the
Investment Law.116 Accordingly, service sectors that do not di-
rectly relate to the production of goods may not benefit from
the Investment Law. Given the growing importance of the ser-
vice industry in the economies of other nations, the PNA needs
to clarify whether the Investment Law is a comprehensive ap-
proach to investments in all service sectors of the economy. Sec-
ond, the Investment Law apparently requires that investments in
existing facilities or enterprises increase both employment and
production. Investments to modernize operations or improve
efficiency but which do not employ new workers might, there-
fore, be ineligible for the benefits of the Investment Law. Third,
Article 14 of the Investment Law excludes certain economic sec-
tors and activities from the procedures of the Investment Law
and requires that any investments in these sectors receive prior
approval directly from the PNA.117
113. See id. arts. 4.4-.5, 18, Appendix at 605, 608-09 (discussing foreign investors in
various contexts).
114. The Draft Translation, for example, expressly defined "Investor" to include
local Palestinians, Palestinians from the diaspora, Arab, and foreign investors. Draft
Translation, supra note 109, art. 1.
115. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 1, Appendix at 603.
116. Id. In contrast, the IPCRI Translation reads "creative productive services,"
and the O'Neill Translation reads "services related to production." IPCRI Translation,
supra note 109, art. 1; O'Neill Translation, supra note 109, art. 1.
117. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 14, Appendix at 608.
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The official PNA summary of the Investment Law states that
the Investment Law prescribes that "investments involving a local
presence must be done through a Palestinian registered com-
pany, which can be a wholly owned subsidiary.""1 8 The Official
Translation of the Investment Law does not, however, contain
any provision that prescribes what form foreign investment must
take in the Palestinian Territories. The existence of a require-
ment that foreign investors must use the corporate form as the
investment structure raises three concerns. First, this require-
ment is not found in the Investment Law, which creates the con-
cern that the Investment Law does not contain the entire legal
regime covering foreign investment. Second, if local Palestini-
ans can invest through partnerships as well as registered compa-
nies, then the requirement to use the corporate form would dis-
criminate against foreign investors, in violation of the Invest-
ment Law's principle of non-discrimination. l 9 Third, the
registered company requirement limits the flexibility of a for-
eign investor. A foreign investor could not, for example, invest
through a branch or a partnership even if those investment vehi-
cles better suited the investor's business strategy and operations.
3. Dues and Income Taxes
The final two definitions in Article 1 are "dues" and "in-
come tax." "Dues" are defined as "customs duties and purchase
tax imposed on machinery, equipment, and raw materials." 2 '
The Investment Law does not indicate what the level of each of
these taxes is or will be,12 ' nor does the definition seem to en-
compass dues on services. "Income tax" is defined as the "in-
come tax levied on the net profit of investment projects." '22 The
Investment Law does not indicate what the rate of PNA income
tax is or will be, nor does it indicate whether "net profit" is to be
determined in accordance with international accounting stan-
118. INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAws, supra note 90, at.11.
119. See Investment Law, art. 18.2, Appendix at 608-09 (setting forth rule on non-
discrimination).
120. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 1, Appendix at 603.
121. The PNA has stated elsewhere that customs duties vary depending on the
imported item and that purchase taxes are payable by manufacturers or importers on
the importation of certain consumer products. INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAWS, supra note
90, at 26, 25.
122. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 1, Appendix at 603.
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dards and practices.' 23
4. Undefined Terms
The Investment Law frequently uses other terms that it does
not define. One of the most prominent terms, and most contro-
versial with respect to its meaning, is "Palestine." What exactly
constitutes "Palestine" remains contentious in the peace process
negotiations. Clearly, it is not in the political interest of the PNA
to define "Palestine" in the Investment Law. The practical effect
of not defining "Palestine" may be minimal because foreign in-
vestment is most needed in those areas clearly under thejurisdic-
tion of the PNA pursuant to the Cairo and Interim Agreements.
Other terms that the Investment Law does not define and
that may raise questions with potential foreign investors include:
(1) "service fees" in Article 8;124 (2) "generally accepted prac-
tices" in Article 9;125 (3) "requisite licenses in accordance with
applicable laws" in Article 11;126 (4) "paid-up capital" in Article
11;127 (5) "Palestinian workers" in Article 11;128 and (6) "life of
the economic project" in Article 11.129 The lack of precision in
drafting terms and provisions in the Investment Law creates in-
terpretive problems for potential foreign investors.
5. General Comment on Definitions
The Investment Law's failure to define important terms in-
dicates that the drafting of the Investment Law was not as com-
plete or thorough as one would expect given the vital impor-
tance of foreign investment to the future of the Palestinian econ-
omy. Further, the Investment Law fails to use its own defined
terms consistently.13 0 This type of drafting places foreign inves-
123. The PNA has stated elsewhere that "Palestinian companies and businesses are
taxed on income generated and/or earned in Palestine and elsewhere subject to the
accounting method used, such as accrual or cash.... The tax rate for companies is
38.5% for the year 1995. This tax rate is expected to decrease in 1996." INVEST IN
PALESTINE: LAws, supra note 90, at 22.
124. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 8, Appendix at 605-06.
125. Id. art. 9, Appendix at 606.
126. Id. art. 11, Appendix at 606-07.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. For example, Article 1 defines the terms "income tax" and "dues," but Article
11 exempts qualifying investments from paying "income tax" and "duties," which latter
term is not defined. Id., arts. 1, 11.1, Appendix at 603, 606-07. This discrepancy might
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tors in a defensive mode, trying to discern the intent of the PNA.
It also suggests a lack of understanding about the importance to
foreign investors of clarity, transparency, and predictability in
legal systems.
B. Institutional Authority
1. Investment Agency
Each investor must submit an investment application to the
Palestinian Higher Agency for the Encouragement of Invest-
ment ("Investment Agency"). Part II of the Investment Law
establishes the Investment Agency and details its composition.
The Investment Agency is supposed to be "an autonomous body
corporate" that reports directly to the President of the PNA.132
The PNA's Minister of Economics, Trade and Industry chairs the
Investment Agency's fifteen-member Board of Directors.1 3
What is not clear from the text is whether all foreign inves-
tors must submit investment projects for review by the Invest-
ment Agency or only those seeking the exemption benefits pro-
vided by the Investment Law. The Investment Law does not ap-
pear to establish a procedure for reviewing investment proposals
from investors not interested in or not able to meet the require-
ments for the exemption benefits provided by the Investment
Law. The entire scheme of the Investment Law seems to be that
only approved investors get economic benefits and incentives.
Arguably, a foreign investor that is not seeking such benefits and
incentives could establish an investment without any review by
the Investment Agency. A more conservative reading of the In-
vestment Law suggests that the Investment Agency must review
all investment proposals, regardless of whether the investor seeks
the benefits of the Investment Law's exemptions. If this con-
servative reading of the Investment Law is correct, then the In-
vestment Law's protections with regards, for example, to expro-
priations and repatriation of capital and profits only apply to in-
vestors approved by the Investment Agency. Foreign investors
raise unnecessary questions from a foreign investor because the exemptions in Article
11 are a key part of the Investment Law.
131. Id. art. 13.1, Appendix at 607.
132. Id. art. 2.1, Appendix at 603-04.
133. See id. art. 3.1, Appendix at 604 (giving detailed composition of Board of Di-
rectors). Counting the Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Board of Directors has
16 members. Id.
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investing without approval would not enjoy any benefits or pro-
tections offered by the Investment Law.
To encourage economic investment in the Palestinian Terri-
tories, the Investment Agency, through its Board of Directors,
has the following powers and responsibilities: (1) directing in-
vestment in accordance with the Palestinian economic plan; (2)
publicizing information to attract development; (3) formulating
suggestions to improve and develop the Investment Law; (4) col-
lecting and publishing studies to encourage local Palestinian,
Arab, and foreign capital investment in the Palestinian Territo-
ries; and (5) holding economic conferences for Palestinian,
Arab, and foreign investors."l 4 Further, the Board of Directors
has all the powers necessary to conduct the Investment Agency's
business in conformity with the objectives of the Investment
Law. 35
The Investment Agency will have a Director-General1 3 6 and
will be funded by contributions from the PNA, "service fees as
determined by the Board of Directors," and donations and
grants that do not contradict public interest.- 7 The Investment
Law does not define service fees and it does not indicate whether
investors are required to pay them to fund the Investment
Agency. Further, the Investment Law does not indicate the po-
tential sources of donations and grants or what sort of donations
and grants would not be in the public interest. 3
Investment Agency decisions are made by majority vote of
the Board of Directors and, in the case of a tie, the Chairman of
the Board of Directors casts the deciding vote.' 9 It is not clear
whether the Chairman of the Board* of Directors gets to vote on
investment proposals when no tie vote exists. The quorum for
the Board of Directors is two-thirds of its members. 4 ° Article 6.3
contains a provision prohibiting any Board member from voting
on matters in which such member has a direct or indirect inter-
134. Id. art. 4, Appendix at 604-05.
135. Id. art. 5, Appendix at 605.
136. Id. art. 7, Appendix at 608.
137. Id. art. 8, Appendix at 605-06.
138. Id. The public interest provision in Article 8 is most likely meant to prohibit
potential foreign investors from buying influence with the Investment Agency by mak-
ing handsome donations to the Agency's budget. If this was the intent, however, the
Investment Law could have been more explicit in its language.
139. Id. art. 6.1, Appendix at 605.
140. Id.
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est."' The Investment Agency can invite anybody to appear
before the Board of Directors.
14 2
The Board of Directors will appoint auditors to audit the
Investment Agency's accounts "in conformity with generally ac-
cepted practices" and submit a financial report to the President
of the PNA every six months.143 This provision indicates that the
PNA realizes the importance of maintaining accurate books of
account at the Investment Agency, but foreign investors and do-
nor countries would be more reassured if the accounts of the
Investment Agency were audited in accordance with internation-
ally recognized accounting practices. The flow of public aid has
been seriously hampered by donor countries' opposition to the
PLO's accounting practices 144 and the Investment Agency
should attempt to avoid similar problems with foreign investors
by adopting internationally accepted accounting practices.
2. Problems with Investment Agency
The Investment Agency's vulnerability to the politics of the
PNA constitutes the greatest concern for potential foreign inves-
tors. Although the Investment Agency is supposed to be autono-
mous and independent, several features of the Investment Law
combine to undermine its autonomy and independence. First,
nine of the members of the Board of Directors will come from
ministries in the PNA (i.e., the Ministries of Economics, Trade,
and Industry, Finance, Planning and International Cooperation,
Industry,' Public Works, Housing, Local Government, PMA, and
the ministry affected by a particular project) and five more will
be appointed directly by the President of the PNA (i.e., the Di-
rector-General of the Investment Agency and four members
from the private sector). 45 Given the composition of the Board
of Directors, it will be hard for the Investment Agency to be in-
dependent from the PNA and its politics. Decisions about for-
141. Id. art. 6.3, Appendix at 605. Presumably, Article 6.3 prevents a Board Mem-
ber from voting on investment proposals in which the Board Member has a direct or
indirect financial interest. The Investment Law would be stronger if the provision had
been spelled out in detail, given the familial and financial networks that dominate the
Palestinian business community.
142. Id. art. 6.4, Appendix at 605.
143. Id. art. 9, Appendix at 606.
144. See Ibrahim, supra note 58, at 2 (discussing donor countries various com-
plaints concerning sending money to PLO).
145. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 3.1, Appendix at 604.
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eign investment involve political consequences and thus will trig-
ger political actions. What will deter foreign investors more,
however, is a politicized process for receiving approval for initiat-
ing and operating investments in the Palestinian Territories.
The appearance of autonomy and independence for the Invest-
ment Agency will not suffice in the long run if the investment
approval process becomes politicized.
Second, the Investment Agency's composition presents for-
eign investors with a formidable bureaucratic challenge. With
the interests of so many ministries represented in the delibera-
tions of the Board of Directors, its decision-making process will
not be transparent or predictable. The dynamics of the Board of
Directors may be such that only forceful direction from the Pres-
ident of the PNA will produce decisions. In such a situation, the
real power resides not in the Investment Agency but in the Presi-
dent's office, opening up even greater potential for politicized
decision-making.
C. Development Sectors
The Investment Law divides the areas under the jurisdiction
of the PNA into three sectors: A, B, and C.146 The locations of
the three development zones are not identified in the Invest-
ment Law, and the designation of the zones is left to the Invest-
ment Agency.' 4 7 Article 10.2 states that the Board of Directors of
the Investment Agency has the right to change the division of
the development sectors and to review the incentives applied to
each, except with respect to already established projects. 4 ' The
Board of Directors may grant additional exemptions to specific
investments to promote the interests of the Palestinian econ-
omy.149
The Investment Law does not indicate how development
sectors A, B and C, as investment regimes, will differ or how di-
viding the areas under PNAjurisdiction into three separate de-
146. Id. art. 10.1, Appendix at 606.
147. Id. The division of the areas under PNAjurisdiction into sectors A, B, and C
may represent the Investment Law's anticipation of the Interim Agreement's phased
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank. The Interim Agreement establishes
Areas A, B, and C and sets out the transfer of authority from Israel to the PNA for each
area. Interim Agreement, supra note 21, art. XI, annex III.
148. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 10.3, Appendix at 606.
149. Id.
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velopment sectors will advance the process of Palestinian eco-
nomic development. As a result, the Investment Law fails to pro-
vide foreign investors with information on an important part of
the PNA's investment and economic development strategy. Fur-
ther, the discretionary powers given to the Board of Directors to
change the classification of development sectors and their ac-
companying incentives 150 and to grant additional exemptions to
specific investments'51 are not qualified by any guidelines or
conditions. Consequently, foreign investors will not be able to
tell from the text of the Investment Law when a development
sector and its incentives may be changed or whether an invest-
ment qualifies for additional exemptions. Articles 10.2 and 10.3
grant the Investment Agency powers that have the potential to
be exercised in an arbitrary and non-transparent manner.
D. Exemptions
The Investment Law exempts approved investment projects
from paying income tax and duties for a period of years based
on the combination of: (1) either the amount of capital invested
or the number of Palestinian workers employed, and (2) the an-
ticipated length of the investment. Article 11.1 of the Invest-
ment Law sets out the following exemption criteria:
Permanent
Project Palestinian Investment Period in Exemption
Description Paid-up Capital Employees Palestine Period
Category A $500,000+ OR At least 25 At least 10-year investment 5 years
Projects
Category B $150,000+ OR At least 15 At least 6-year investment 3 years
Projects
Category C $100,000+ OR At least 10 At least 5-year investment 2 years
Projects
Category D $5,000,000+ AND At least 50 At discretion of Investment At discretion of
Projects Agency Investment
Agency
1 5 2
To receive the exemptions from income taxes and duties, 53
150. Id. art. 10.2, Appendix at 606.
151. Id. art. 10.3, Appendix at 606.
152. Id. art. 11.1, Appendix at 606-07.
153. Article 11.1 exempts approved investments from "duties," which is not
defined in the Investment Law. Id. In all likelihood, the reference to "duties" in Article
11.1 should say "dues," which is defined in Article 1. Id. art. 1, Appendix at 603.
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an approved investor must first have "paid-up capital" of a
specified amount invested in a project or must employ on a
permanent basis a certain number of Palestinian workers.
Category D projects, however, require both specific paid-up
capital and permanent employee amounts.1 5 4 As mentioned
earlier, the Investment Law does not define "paid-up capital," so
it is not clear exactly what the Investment Agency will consider as
paid-up capital for purposes of Article 11.1. Similarly, the
Investment Law does not define "Palestinian workers," leaving
open the possibility that it includes: Palestinians habitually
resident in the Palestinian Territories, Palestinians from the
diaspora, or any person residing in the Palestinian Territories at
the time of employment. Further, "permanent" employment is
not defined by the Investment Law. The Investment Law is also
silent as to how the Investment Agency will determine whether a
project satisfies the "life of the economic project" requirement.
Another problem with Article 11.1 involves the prospective
nature of the requirements. At the time an investment project
receives approval from the Investment Agency, the investor
anticipates investing a certain amount of capital, employing a
certain number of Palestinian employees, and remaining in the
Palestinian Territories for a certain number of years. The
Investment Law does not indicate at what point after approval an
investor must satisfy the paid-up capital and permanent
Palestinian employee requirements. Given the ability of the
Investment Agency to cancel investment approval for failure to
comply with the required conditions and to demand payment of
all taxes and dues from which the investor was exempted from
the time of approval through cancellation, 55 an investor will be
keen to know at what point it is subject to such a sanction in
relation to the paid-up capital and permanent Palestinian
employee requirements of Article 11.1.
Finally, simply meeting the requirements of any of the
categories in Article 11.1 does not assure an investor of the
receipt of the stated exemptions. Before qualifying for the
exemptions in Article 11.1, an investor must obtain the approval
of the Investment Agency and obtain all requisite licenses to
154. Id. art. 11.1, Appendix at 606-07.
155. Id. art. 19.1, Appendix at 609.
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conduct business.'56  Neither Article 11.1 nor any other
provision in the Investment Law guarantees that when an
investor invests a certain amount of money or employs a certain
number of people the investment proposal will be approved.
Apparently, other criteria can affect the approval process; but,
other than the exclusion of certain economic sectors from the
normal application procedure"5 7  and the restriction on
investments that might conflict with public morals, order, and
security or environmental protection laws, 158 the Investment Law
does not state what other criteria should be considered. The
Investment Agency's discretion in approving investment
proposals is very broad, which could leave potential investors
guessing about their chances for approval.
Article 11.1 sets out the requirements for the basic benefits
available to investors under the Investment Law, but the
Investment Agency has more discretion in granting additional
benefits in three other situations. First, under Article 11.2, the
Investment Agency "may grant certain projects additional
exemptions depending on the nature of the project and the
needs and development priorities of the Palestinians."' 59 The
Investment Law contains no specific criteria for the granting of
additional exemptions under Article 11.2 and does not indicate
what the additional exemptions might be. Thus, the Investment
Agency could exercise the power found in Article 11.2 in an
arbitrary and non-transparent manner because no parameters
discipline this power.
Second, Article 12 allows the Investment Agency to grant
special exemptions to export projects.1 60  Such special
exemptions may be granted to enterprises that export not less
than twenty-five percent of their total output and whose
products contain Palestinian-added value equal to not less than
thirty percent of the total cost of the product.161 The Investment
156. See id. art. 11.1, Appendix at 606-07 (stating that projects must be approved by
Investment Agency and must have obtained requisite licenses before exemptions are
granted); id. art. 13.1, Appendix at 607 (setting forth requirement that investor must
satisfy "all licensing procedures or any other requirements provided for under
applicable laws and regulations").
157. Id. art. 14, Appendix at 608.
158. Id. art. 21.2, Appendix at 610.
159. Id. art. 11.2, Appendix at 607.
160. Id. art. 12, Appendix at 607.
161. Id. The Investment Law actually states that "special exceptional exemptions"
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Law does not indicate whether the twenty-five percent of total
output requirement means twenty-five percent of total output as
determined against the total number of articles produced or the
total value of articles manufactured. 16 2 Nor does the Investment
Law spell out how the Investment Agency will calculate the
percentage of value added to any product in the Palestinian
Territories. The Palestinian-added value requirement acts like a
"rule of origin" to ensure that investors that get special export
benefits under the Investment Law are utilizing Palestinian
labor, parts, and/or raw materials. 163  An investor, however,
needs to know how to calculate the Palestinian-added value if it
hopes to get special export exemptions under Article 12.
Third, Article 12 allows the Investment Agency to grant
additional incentives for "export-oriented agricultural
products."' 64 Again, the Investment Law provides no indication
what these "additional incentives" might be. What constitutes an
agricultural product is also not defined. Oranges, for example,
would obviously be an agricultural product; but it is not clear
whether exports of orange juice or other products derived from
oranges would be agricultural products for purposes of the
Investment Law.
A more general problem with Article 12 mirrors the
troubling aspect of Article 11.2: the Investment Agency has total
discretion to grant exceptional and additional exemptions and
incentives.' 65 If an investor exports over twenty-five percent of
may be granted to export projects "provided that the percentage of output processed
for export is not less than 25 per cent of the total output and that the value is not less
than 30 per cent of the total cost of the project." Id. The author of this Article,
however, had to refer to the IPCRI, O'Neill, and Draft Translations to conclude that the
last phrase quoted above meant that the product destined for export had to contain
Palestinian-added value equal to at least 30% of the cost of the product. The PNA
official summary of the Investment Law confirms this interpretation. See INVEST IN
PALESTINE: LAWS, supra note 90, at 12.
162. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 12, Appendix at 607. The distinction
might be important if an investor can sell its products at a higher price overseas than in
the Palestinian Territories. In such a case, the exports may exceed 25% of the total
value of all articles manufactured but not exceed 25% of the total number of items
produced. Id.
163. The U.S.-Palestinian free trade agreement will include rules of origin to
define what products qualify as Palestinian products benefitting from duty-free
treatment in the United States. The rules of origin in the free trade agreement may
differ from Article 12's 30% requirement.
164. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 12, Appendix at 607.
165. Id.
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its total output and its products contain over thirty percent
Palestinian-added value, the investor still may not get additional
benefits under the Investment Law because of the discretionary
nature of the Investment Agency's Article 12 power. Article 12,
at least, suggests that the PNA wants to adopt an "export model"
of economic development as opposed to an "import
substitution" model,1 66  but the discretion given to the
Investment Agency, along with the lack of precision and clarity
in Article 12, creates obstacles for investors seeking to invest and
export from the Palestinian Territories.
E. Procedures for Getting Exemption Benefits
1. General Procedure
Before an investor can apply to the Investment Agency for
the exemption benefits available under the Investment Law, the
investor must satisfy "all licensing procedures or any other re-
quirements provided for under applicable laws and regula-
tions." '67 The Investment Law provides a potential investor with
no guidance as to what other licenses and other procedures have
to be satisfied before an application is filed with the Investment
Agency or from whom they must be obtained. Given the current
state of Palestinian law, the prerequisite set forth in Article 13.1
is not a mere formality and exposes an investor to the confusion
of existing Palestinian law. The requirement that an investor re-
ceive all other licenses and satisfy all applicable regulations
before approaching the Investment Agency could deter invest-
ment because an investor would want approval from the Invest-
ment Agency before expending time, money, and energy getting
licenses and satisfying other regulations. It would have been bet-
ter to allow investors to get approval from the Investment
Agency before getting all necessary licenses and permits and to
condition receipt of the exemptions in Article 11.1 upon the re-
ceipt of all other regulatory permissions.
After having obtained all required licenses and fulfilled all
applicable regulations, an investor must submit an application to
166. The import and customs provisions of the Economic Protocol do not give the
PNA competence to establish customs duties, except in limited circumstances. Cairo
Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. III, 33 I.L.M. at 698; Interim Agreement, supra
note 21, annex V, art. III; Kieiman, supra note 23, at 358-60.
167. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 13.1, Appendix at 607.
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the Investment Agency. 168 The investor must support the appli-
cation with a "technical and economic feasibility study of the
project."169 The Investment Law provides no other guidelines or
criteria to potential investors interested in applying for approval
of an investment proposal.
The Investment Agency has between thirty and sixty days
from the date of the application to provide the investor with an
answer that includes the reasons behind the decision. 7 If the
Investment Agency gives its approval to the proposed project,
the investor must present "an action plan detailing the steps to
be followed to complete the project."17 The approved invest-
ment project must be started within six months of the date of
approval.172 The fixing of a single date by which an investment
project must be under way could create problems for some
projects that need more lead time for starting up. The six-
month start-up requirement essentially forces investors to be
ready to go upon approval of the investment, which means the
investor has to spend more time and money before approval is in
hand. Thus, Article 13.3 raises yet another unnecessary obstacle
to potential investors. Further, the investor undertakes to pro-
vide information and data concerning the project's implementa-
tion and operation and to allow any Investment Agency official
to enter the premises of the project to verify whether the inves-
tor is performing as indicated. 7 It is not clear whether Article
13.4 establishes a requirement for periodic reporting of informa-
tion by the investor or only a requirement to submit information
as requested by the Investment Agency.
174
2. Special Procedure
The Investment Law sets up a special approval procedure
for investment proposals in weapons and ammunition, aviation
(including airports), electrical power, waste disposal, petroleum,
and telecommunications (including radio and television) indus-
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. art. 13.2, Appendix at 607.
171. Id. art. 13.3, Appendix at 607.
172. Id.
173. Id. art. 13.4, Appendix at 607-08.
174. The IPCRI, O'Neill, and Draft Translations translate the provision in question
to require submission of information as requested by the Investment Agency. See supra
note 109 (discussing different translations of Investment Law).
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tries.175 The PNA has to approve all investment proposals re-
lated to these industries.1 76 Whether Article 14, in substance, es-
tablishes a special approval procedure for specific economic sec-
tors is questionable given how the PNA dominates the Board of
Directors of the Investment Agency. Article 14 does not indicate
what organ or branch of the PNA has the power of approval for
investment proposals in those specified industries. Further, Arti-
cle 14 provides no guidelines that indicate to an investor what
the decision-making criteria will be for purposes of Article 14.
As for the industries subject to Article 14, the list contains mostly
industries that relate directly to economic infrastructure and ba-
sic economic needs. 17 7 Given the desperate need for investment
in such infrastructure and fundamental economic areas, the ra-
tionale behind singling these industry sectors out for explicitly
political approval is unclear. While each of the listed industries
has some "public good" element to it, the public interest could
be protected through regulation rather than through an overtly
political process of investment approval.
F. Transfer Issues
1. Transfer of the Investment Project
The Investment Law addresses the availability of exemptions
already granted in situations where the original investor sells or
otherwise transfers the project or the project's assets to another
investor. Article 15 provides that the new owner of an approved
project will continue to benefit from the exemptions under the
Investment Law so long as the new owner operates the enter-
prise in the same manner as the old owner and assumes all the
rights and obligations undertaken by the previous owner in ac-
cordance with the Investment Law.1 78 The Investment Law ap-
parently does not require that the Investment Agency recom-
mend or approve of the transfer of an already approved project.
The requirement that the new owner operate the enterprise in
the same way as the old owner is problematical because the old
owner's operating manner may not be prudent or competitive.
Clearly, the Investment Law does not condemn a new owner to
175. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 14, Appendix at 608.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. art. 15, Appendix at 608.
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conduct business in conformity with a bad business strategy em-
ployed by the previous owner. Just how differently a new owner
can operate the enterprise in search of business success is not
clear. Finally, the Investment Law does not indicate whether the
selling investor may repatriate the proceeds from the sale of the
investment.
2. Transfer of Investment Assets
Article 16 provides that an approved investor may sell its
fixed assets to "another project enjoying the same privileges
under the provisions of this Law, provided that the Agency ap-
proves such a sale, giving priority in the purchase of these assets
to Palestinian investors."' 79 Article 16 places two very significant
restrictions on the free transferability of assets within the Pales-
tinian Territories.
First, an approved investor can only sell its fixed assets to
another approved investor enjoying the same exemptions under
the Investment Law. 8' A sale from a foreign approved investor
to a local Palestinian company that is not enjoying exemptions
under the Investment Law is not permitted under Article 16. Ar-
ticle 16 also does not allow fixed asset transfers that are de
minimis transfers, transfers of old or obsolete equipment, or
transfers of assets not essential to the core economic activity of
the investment project.
Second, all asset transfers must be approved by the Invest-
ment Agency. ' The criteria by which the Investment Agency
will decide on asset transfer proposals are not articulated in Arti-
cle 16, except for the provision that the Investment Agency must
give priority to Palestinian purchasers. Furthermore, the Invest-
ment Law does not state whether the proceeds from the sale of
fixed assets may be repatriated by a foreign investor. The restric-
tions on the free transferability of assets in Article 16 will consti-
tute a serious disincentive to potential investors, particular for-
eign investors.
179. Id. art. 16, Appendix at 608.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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G. Nationalization, Non-Discrimination, and Repatriation of Capital
and Profits
1. Nationalization
Article 18.1 states that "[n]o investment, irrespective of the
investor's nationality, shall be nationalized, confiscated or expro-
priated in whole or in part Without the investor's consent.' 82 At
first glance, this provision seems extraordinary because most
states consider the right to expropriate property as an inherent
attribute of sovereignty and exercisable without the agreement
or consent of the foreign investor. The standard governing the
compensation of the foreign investor for an expropriation of its
property has been the controversial issue under international
law. Article 18.1's requirement that the investor agree to any
expropriation appears to indicate that the PNA is not claiming
the full power to expropriate. 183
The second sentence of Article 18.1, however, qualifies the
requirement of investor agreement to an expropriation by stat-
182. Id. art. 18.1, Appendix at 608.
183. Id. Significantly, the PNA could not claim under international law a sover-
eign right to expropriate because it does not have the status of a sovereign state under
international law. The lack of competence over foreign affairs on the part of the PNA
in the Cairo Agreement and the Interim Agreement deprives the PNA of one of the
traditional hallmarks of sovereignty. See Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, arts. V(1) (b),
VI(2) (a), 33 I.L.M. at 630; Interim Agreement, supra note 21, art. IX(5). As Hans-Peter
Gasser observed in analyzing whether the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War applied in the Palestinian Territories
after the Declaration:
Not only the text of the Declaration of Principles and of the Cairo Agreement
but also political reality make it clear that the Autonomous Territories (the
Gaza Strip and Jericho Area) lack essential elements of sovereignty. Absence
of statehood precludes the Palestinian Authority from exercising powers
which are essential to any sovereign State.
Hans-Peter Gasser, The Geneva Conventions and the Autonomous Territories in the Middle
East, 26 SECURrrv DIALOGUE, June 1995, at 173, 175-76. Yoram Dinstein also observes
that "[iut is incontrovertible that the exercise of autonomous power does not amount to
sovereignty or statehood." Yoram Dinstein, Autonomy and Legal Status: A Rejoinder, SE-
CuRrrv DIALOGUE, June 1995, at 185, i88. On the other hand, the Palestinian Territo-
ries are not merely a part of Israel because the Cairo Agreement and Interim Agree-
ment give the PNA power over significant aspects of political, legal, and economic mat-
ters. As reflected in the decision by the U.S. Customs Service to require special country
of origin marking requirements for goods from Gaza and the West Bank, the Palestin-
ian Territories have a distinct identity and cannot be subsumed in any other political
entity. For a discussion of autonomy and international law, see Hurst Hannum & Rich-
ard B. Lillich, The Concept of Autonomy in International Law, in MODELS OF AUTONOMY 215
(Yoram Dinstein ed., 1981).
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ing that no investment shall be subjected to nationalization or
expropriation "except in compliance with a final judgment
handed down by a competent court."1 8 4 The Palestinian Council
could pass a non-discriminatory law nationalizing or expropriat-
ing certain investments, and such law could be enforced by the
Palestinian courts without the agreement of the investor. The
second sentence of Article 18.1, in essence, preserves the power
to expropriate without the consent of the investor, subject only
to the principle that any expropriation cannot discriminate be-
tween investors on the basis of nationality. The Investment Law
is silent as to the standard that would govern the compensation
of an investor subject to an expropriation.
2. Principle of Non-Discrimination
Article 18.2 of the Investment Law states that all foreign,
Arab, and expatriate Palestinian investors shall enjoy the same
rights and privileges accorded the local Palestinian investor."'
Article 18.3 states that expatriate Palestinian investors, Arab 'in-
vestors, and other foreign investors "shall enjoy the right of per-
manent residence in accordance with applicable laws."18 6 Both
Articles 18.2 and 18.3 support the principle of non-discrimina-
tory treatment first expressed in Article I's definition of investor.
3. Repatriation of Capital and Profit
Articles 18.4 and 18.5 provide that approved investors have
the right to transfer capital and profits after paying the dues pre-
scribed by the Palestinian laws and legislation. 18 7 The Invest-
ment Law does not create a clear right to transfer capital and
profits freely because the PNA could impose dues at a rate that
effectively deters such transfers. Whether the Investment Law
creates free transferability of capital and profits depends on the
level of the dues imposed on such transfers by the PNA. The
Investment Law also gives no indication about the present or fu-
ture level of such capital and profit transfer dues. Every foreign
investor will want to know the level of dues to be paid when mak-
ing its calculation whether to invest in the Palestinian Territo-
184. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.1, Appendix at 608.
185. Id. art. 18.2, Appendix at 608-09.
186. Id. art 18.3, Appendix at 609.
187. Id. art. 18.4-.5, Appendix at 609.
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ies. A foreign investor will also want to know whether the pro-
ceeds from the sale of an investment or of fixed assets addressed
in Articles 15 and 16 fall within the definition of "capital" or
"profits" for purposes of Articles 18.4 and 18.5.
H. Suspension or Cancellation of Benefits
The Investment Agency may suspend or cancel the exemp-
tions granted under the Investment Law prospectively or retroac-
tively if the Investment Agency determines that an approved in-
vestor has failed to meet the conditions and obligations imposed
by the Investment Law.""' The Investment Agency may also can-
cel an investor's investment license retroactively if it discovers
that the investor obtained investment approval through fraud,
bribery, or illegal acts.189
It is important to note that, when the Investment Agency
cancels an investment approval, the effect can be retroactive
under Article 19.1 and will be retroactive under Article 19.2 to
the date the approval was originally granted.19 ° An investor that
has its approval canceled not only loses the future benefits of the
exemptions available under the Investment Law but also may
have to pay immediately to the PNA all taxes, dues, fees, and
other sums from which it had been exempt, plus interest ac-
crued on such amounts, all from the date of approval. The fi-
nancial penalty for cancellation of an investment approval could
potentially be severe. Under Article 19.3, the investor subject to
a cancellation order may appeal within thirty days of such deci-
sion by the Investment Agency to the President of the PNA,
whose decision on the appeal is final.1 91 This provision com-
pletely removes cancellation decisions from review by Palestinian
courts under the general dispute settlement provision of the In-
vestment Law.1 92 An investor has no recourse against a retroac-
tive cancellation of investment approval made for political rea-
sons by either the Investment Agency or the President of the
PNA. As a result, an investor is clearly vulnerable to politicized
investment decisions under Article 19.
188. Id. art. 19.1, Appendix at 609.
189. Id. art. 19.2, Appendix at 609.
190. Id. art. 19.1-.2, Appendix at 609.
191. Id. art. 19.3, Appendix at 609.
192. See id. art. 20, Appendix at 609 (setting forth dispute settlement procedure).
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I. Dispute Resolution
All disputes under the Investment law shall be resolved by
Palestinian courts.' 93 This provision, of course, is qualified by
Article 19.3's procedure for final resolution of cancellation dis-
putes by the President of the PNA.' 94 Article 20 seems to pre-
clude an agreement between the investor and the PNA to submit
disputes to binding independent arbitration, because such an
agreement would by-pass the jurisdiction of the Palestinian
courts. Independent binding arbitration is, however, a fre-
quently used mechanism in the settlement of international in-
vestment disputes. In its official summary of the Investment
Law, the PNA claims that the Investment Law "admits the possi-
bility of dispute resolution through arbitration."195 No article of
the Investment Law mentions, directly or indirectly, the possibil-
ity of arbitration to settle disputes. If the PNA wants to include
arbitration as a dispute settlement mechanism for foreign inves-
tors, then it should do so expressly in the Investment Law. The
Article 20 reference to "applicable Palestinian laws" suggests that
all investment agreements between foreign investors and the
PNA are to be governed by, and construed in accordance with,
Palestinian law, a situation that is likely to make any foreign in-
vestor nervous given the current state of Palestinian law.' 96
J. General and Final Provisions
1. Non-Discriminatory Business Practices
In operating approved investments in the Palestinian Terri-
tories, investors must not discriminate on the basis of sex, race,
or religion when employing local staff, procuring supplies, or
conducting any other activity.197 This provision represents the
Investment Law's contribution to the development of the princi-
193. Id.
194. See id. art. 19.3, Appendix at 609. (setting forth role of PNA's President in
final dispute resolution).
195. INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAWS, supra note 90, at 12.
196. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 20, Appendix at 609. Since the Palestin-
ian Territories do not constitute a state and cannot claim sovereignty under interna-
tional law, the PNA presumably can not raise either sovereign immunity or act of state
as defenses against a claim by a private investor. See supra note 183 (discussing PNA's
lack of sovereignty under international law). For a discussion of the doctrines of sover-
eign immunity and act of state, see IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAw 322-36, 507-08 (4th ed. 1990).
197. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 21.1, Appendix at 610.
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ple of non-discrimination in the Palestinian Territories. The ex-
act content of the non-discrimination principle in Palestinian
law is not, however, fully developed. Additionally, a foreign in-
vestor might worry that the Palestinian principle of non-discrimi-
nation will entail different business practices than required in
other countries.
2. General Limitations on Investments
Investments in the Palestinian Territories can be made in
any economic sector so long as they do not "conflict with public
morals, public order, public security, and environmental protec-
tion laws." 98 Perhaps the most troubling aspect of these broad,
undefined terms is the condition that investments not conflict
with "public morals." The Investment Law provides no guide-
lines for the investor to evaluate this condition prior to invest-
ment. The tension in Palestinian society created by the strength
of Islamic fundamentalist groups like Hamas could elevate issues
of "public morals" in connection with the impact of foreign in-
vestment on Palestinian society.
3. Status of Investment Law
Article 22 renders invalid and revoked any law that is incon-
sistent with or contrary to the Investment Law."' This provision
is important because it attempts to cut through the confusion of
existing Palestinian law and enshrine the Investment Law as the
supreme source of law in the area of foreign investment. Simi-
larly, all competent authorities of the PNA in the Palestinian
Territories are required to implement and execute the Invest-
ment Law.200
IV. THE INVESTMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
PRACTICES
This part of the Article will compare the Investment Law to
four different international standards: (1) the trend in liberaliz-
ing investment laws apparent in the late 1980's and 1990's
198. Id. art. 21.2, Appendix at 610. The IPCRI and O'Neill Translations render
this condition as no conflict with "public order" and environmental protection legisla-
tion. See supra note 109 (discussing ICPRI and O'Neill Translations).
199. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 22, Appendix at 610.
200. Id. art. 23, Appendix at 610.
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among developing countries; (2) the principles in the recent
agreements on trade-related investment measures and trade in
services adopted under the new General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade ("GATT") ;201 (3) the World Bank Guidelines on Di-
rect Foreign Investment; and (4) the model U.S. bilateral invest-
ment treaty. The analysis in this part of the Article will indicate
how the Investment Law compares against the latest interna-
tional thinking and practices in the area of foreign private invest-
ment.
A. The Trend of Liberalization in Investment Laws
The treatment of foreign investments by most countries has
generated significant controversy in the international system.
Perhaps the most well-known example of the heated nature of
the controversy is the standard applicable under international
law for compensating a foreign investor subject to an expropria-
tion of property.20 2 The nature of foreign investment laws in de-
veloping states has tracked the ebb and flow of the acrimonious
North-South debate on international economic justice. Develop-
ing countries moved towards restrictive investment laws in the
1970's during the push for the New International Economic Or-
der ("NIEO") .2 3 The NIEO had essentially two basic goals: (1)
to allow developing countries to regain economic sovereignty by
reducing the power and influence of nationals and corporations
from developed countries in the economies of developing coun-
tries;2 0 4 and (2) to increase the power and influence of develop-
ing counties in the international economic system.2 0 5 Restrictive
201. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 (1950).
202. M. SORNARAJAH, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT 357 (1994).
See also BROWNLIE, supra note 196, at 531-45; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 712 (1987) (discussing state responsibility for eco-
nomic injury to nationals of other states).
203. RALPH H. FOLSoM & MICHAEL W. GORDON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAC-
TIONS 770 (1995).
204. Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res.
1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962); Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp.
No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) [hereinafter Economic Charter]. Article 2 of
the Economic Charter sets forth a comprehensive summation of this goal. Id. art. 2, at
52.
205. This goal is embodied in the Economic Charter in the form of various rights
and duties designed to provide developing countries with preferential treatment in the
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foreign investment laws were part of the NIEO strategy. 20 6 New
theories about foreign investment and economic development,
like dependency theory, influenced the NIEO position on for-
eign investment. 20 7
The 1980's and 1990's, however, have witnessed developing
states adopting more liberalized investment laws in order to at-
tract foreign investment.20 8 This movement from restrictive to
more liberal foreign investment laws happened for both practi-
cal and theoretical economic reasons. In practical terms, the re-
strictive policies implemented by developing countries did not
result in significant economic growth.20 9 Eventually, the failure
of restrictive economic policies led to a re-evaluation of the theo-
retical bases for such policies and to a rejection of the depen-
dency thesis.2 0
international economic system. See generally Economic Charter, supra note 204. For
example, Article 13(1) of the Economic Charter states that every state has "the right to
benefit from the advances and developments in science and technology for the acceler-
ation of its economic and social development." Id. art. 13(1), at 53. Article 14 of the
Economic Charter states that the duty to cooperate in promoting expansion and liber-
alization of world trade means that states should:
[T]ake measures aimed at securing additional benefits for the international
trade of developing countries so as to achieve a substantial increase in their
foreign exchange earnings, the diversification of their exports, the accelera-
tion of the rate of growth of their trade, taking into account their develop-
ment needs, an improvement in the possibilities for these countries to partici-
pate in the expansion of world trade and a balance more favorable to develop-
ing counties in the sharing of the advantages resulting from this expansion.
Id. art. 14, at 53.
206. Id. art. 2(2)(a), at 52. Article 2(2)(a) of the Economic Charter states that
each state has the right "[t]o regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment
within its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in con-
formity with its national objectives and priorities." Id.
207. Dependency theory holds, essentially, that "foreign investment will not bring
about meaningful economic development" and that "foreign investment is uniformly
bad and rather than promote economic development, it keeps underdeveloped coun-
tries in a state of permanent dependence on the central economies of the developed
states." SORNARAJAH, supra note 202, at 43-44. For a detailed discussion of dependency
theory, see GILPIN, supra note 18, at 281-90.
208. See FoLsoM & GORDON, supra note 203, at 587-88, 766-67, 773-75 (discussing
liberalization of investment laws). See also Jose Luis Siqueiros, Bilateral Treaties on the
Reciprocal Protection of Foreign Investment, 24 CAL. WEST. INT'L L.J. 255 (1994) (addressing
same). For a discussion of attempts by Latin American countries to liberalize their for-
eign investment laws, see generally Eduardo A. Wiesner, ANCOM: A New Attitude To-
ward Foreign Investment?, 24 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. RPv. 435 (1993).
209. GILPIN, supra note 18, at 292-94.
210. Gilpin notes that "[b]eliefs held by structuralists and dependency theorists
alike that the less developed countries could not develop within the framework of an
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The Investment Law reflects the trend towards liberal invest-
ment laws on the part of developing states seeking foreign invest-
ment to boost economic development in five areas. First, the
Investment Law does not on its face prohibit foreign investors
from investing in certain sectors of the economy, which has been
a feature of investment laws of developed and developing coun-
tries.2 1 1 Nor does the Investment Law reserve certain economic
sectors or industries for local investors. 12 The Investment
Agency, through Article 13, and the PNA, through Article 14,
might in practice implement such prohibitions or protections,
but any such practice would violate the principle of non-discrimi-
nation contained in the Investment Law.213
Second, the Investment Law does not require any level of
local equity participation in foreign investments through
mandatory joint venture arrangements. Some developing and
socialist states required foreign investors to have a local partner
by forming a joint venture.214 The principle of non-discrimina-
tion in the Investment Law suggests that the Investment Agency
will not create a de facto local equity mandate through the ap-
proval process.
Third, the Investment Law contains no limitations on for-
eign investors acquiring Palestinian companies. The investment
laws of some countries regulate the acquisition of local compa-
nies either to prevent acquisitions from having anti-competitive
effects or to protect domestic companies from foreign control
and competition. 215 The Investment Law's definition of invest-
ment focuses on expanding employment and production, which
could be achieved by the acquisition of a local Palestinian com-
pany as well as by establishing a new entity.
Fourth, the Investment Law does not mandate that manage-
ment be composed of a certain number or percentage of resi-
dent Palestinians. The laws of some states require that the board
of directors of a company or its local management contain cer-
unreformed world capitalism . . . are contradicted by the facts of the late twentieth
century." Id. at 305.
211. FoLSOM & GORDON, supra note 203, at 581.
212. Id. at 580.
213. See Investment Law, supra note 109, arts. 18.2, 21.1, Appendix at 608-09, 610
(setting forth non-discrimination rules).
214. SORNARAjAH, supra note 202, at 111-13, 115-16; FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note
203, at 581, 770.
215. FoLsoM & GORDON, supra note 203, at 584-85.
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tain numbers of local residents, often in conjunction with local
equity participation requirements. 16 The Investment Law has
no requirement that management of Palestinian companies in-
clude or be controlled by Palestinians.
Fifth, the Investment Law contains no performance require-
ments, which can take the form of local content rules,
mandatory export targets, or mandatory transfers of technol-
ogy. 2 17 States implement such performance requirements osten-
sibly to benefit or protect the local economy. The Investment
Law makes exemption benefits available to investors that hire a
certain numbers of Palestinian employees, 18 but this does not
necessarily mean that a foreign investor must hire a certain
number of local employees to invest or get Investment Agency
approval. Further, an investor can get extra benefits by export-
ing a certain percentage of output containing a specified level of
Palestinian content,219 but such an inducement is not a mandate
to export.
While the Investment Law reflects in these five areas the lib-
eral approach prevalent in investment laws adopted in the 1980's
and 1990's by many developing states, it contains many signifi-
cant measures reminiscent of provisions adopted by developing
states in the 1970's. First, as already noted in Part III, the Invest-
ment Law's approval process and other decision-making proce-
dures are highly discretionary in nature.220 The Investment Law
is not a transparent regime with objective criteria upon which
foreign investors can plan their investments with predictability
and confidence. Second, the dominant role of the PNA in the
Board of Directors of the Investment Agency creates the poten-
tial for a highly politicized investment process.221 Third, the In-
vestment Law places significant restraints on the transfer of as-
sets222 and leaves the door open for the PNA to restrict the repa-
216. Id. at 581, 771.
217. See SORNARAJAH, supra note 202, at 109-11 (offering examples of laws requir-
ing export target requirements); FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 203, at 585, 770-72
(noting examples of performance requirements).
218. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 11, Appendix at 606-07.
219. Id. art. 12, Appendix at 607.
220. See, e.g., supra notes 146-51, 157-66 and accompanying text (discussing lack of
transparency of Investment Law with regard to transfer and nationalization issues).
221. See, e.g., supra notes 145, 188-92 and accompanying text (pointing out vulner-
ability of foreign investor to politics of PNA).
222. Investment Law, supra note 109, arts. 15, 16, Appendix at 608.
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triation of capital and profits. 3 Fourth, the Investment Law
does not state what the standard for compensating investors for
expropriations will be in the Palestinian Territories. Fifth, the
Investment Law eliminates an investor's recourse to independ-
ent judicial or arbitral review for decisions canceling investment
approval. 24 Sixth, the Investment Law does not indicate
whether the Investment Agency or PNA would be willing to sub-
mit investment disputes to binding independent arbitration. In
weighing those aspects of the Investment Law that reflect the
liberalization movement in foreign investment laws and those as-
pects that create a restrictive, opaque, and potentially politicized
investment regime, the Investment Law cannot be viewed overall
as a liberal foreign investment code fully in tune with the current
historical movement in this area.
Whether the Investment Law in practice actually reflects the
liberalization trend in host nation investment laws or is restric-
tive, discriminatory, and politicized depends on the behavior of
the Investment Agency and the PNA and the nature of the legis-
lation impacting foreign investment enacted by the PNA. Like
many other investment laws, the review and approval process
gives the supervising authority ample discretion to pursue many
different objectives and policies. Folsom and Gordon observe
that how a state regulates foreign investment is often not found
in its written law but in its unwritten law: the "operational
code."2 Whether the Investment Agency develops an unwrit-
ten law to compliment or contradict the Investment Law remains
to be seen. 226
B. The Investment Law, TRIMS, and GATS
For the first time in the history of GATT, the Uruguay
Round negotiations included agreements on trade-related in-
vestment measures and trade in services. The rules and proce-
223. See id. art. 18.4-.5, Appendix at 609 (setting forth capital and profit repatria-
tion requirements). See also FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 203, at 586-87 (offering
examples of capital repatriation restrictions).
224. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 19.3, Appendix at 609. See generally FOL.
SOM & GoRDON, supra note 203, at 773 (discussing dispute settlement).
225. FOLSOM & GORDON, supra note 203, at 596-602.
226. "If the PNA's apparent commitment to a 'hands off' style of economic man-
agement turns out to be real, the future Palestinian economy could be one of the most
liberal in the Middle East." Warmed Up with Nowhere to Run: Palestinian Private Sector,
MIDDLE EAST ECON. DIG., Aug. 18, 1995, at 11.
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dures of the Investment Law can be usefully compared to the key
principles in the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Meas-
ures 27 ("TRIMS") and the General Agreement on Trade in Serv-
ices ("GATS").28
1. National Treatment
Both TRIMS229 and GATS2 11 contain the principle of na-
tional treatment. A Member of GATT may not apply a trade-
related investment measure or a measure affecting market access
for the supply of services in a way that treats a foreign investor or
service supplier less favorably than domestic investors or service
suppliers.23' Trade-related investment measures that are incon-
sistent with the principle of national treatment include those
that are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or com-
pliance with which is necessary to obtain an advantage and that
require: (a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of
domestic origin or from domestic sources, or (b) that an enter-
prise's purchases or use of imported products be limited to a
volume amount or to the value of local products the enterprise
exports.232 Measures that Members of GATT may not take
under GATS to restrict market access include limitations on: (a)
the number of service suppliers; (b) the total number of service
transactions or assets; (c) the total number of service operations
227. Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, opened for signature Dec.
15, 1993, GATr Sales No. 1994-4 (1994) [hereinafter TRIMS].
228. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M 44 (1993)
[hereinafter GATS]. The following analysis does not imply that the PNA could become
a member of GATT. The Cairo Agreement and Interim Agreement do not give the
PNA the competence to enter into treaties like GAT. See Cairo Agreement, supra note
20, arts. V(1)(b), VI(2)(a)-(b), 33 I.L.M. at 629-30; Interim Agreement, supra note 21,
art. IX(5) (discussing principles applicable to PNA's foreign affairs). Further, the fol-
lowing analysis does not purport to be a complete examination of TRIMS and GATS but
only a comparison of their major principles with the Investment Law. For a more com-
plete analysis of GATS, see generally Mary E. Footer, The International Regulation of Trade
in Services Following Completion of the Uruguay Round, 29 INr'L LAw. 453 (1995); William
C. Yue, Trade in Services Under GATS and the NAFTA, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND INvEsTMENT 1994, at 195 (PLI Corporate Law and
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-863, 1994).
229. TRIMS, supra note 227, art. 2(2).
230. GATS, supra note 228, art. XVII, 33 I.L.M. at 60-61.
231. Id. art. XVI, 33 I.L.M. at 60. Article XVII of GATS states that Members shall
accord to services and service suppliers of any other Member, with respect to all meas-
ures affecting the supply of services, treatment no less favorable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers. Id. art. XVII, 33 I.L.M. at 60-61.
232. TRIMS, supra note 227, annex (1).
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or total quantity of service output; (d) the total number of em-
ployees; (e) the type of entity through which a service supplier
may supply a service; and (f) the participation of foreign capital
in a service enterprise. 33
The Investment Law does not contain any of the trade-re-
lated investment measures or market-restricting service measures
identified in TRIMS and GATS as violative of the principle of
national treatment. As mentioned before, a key principle of the
Investment Law is non-discrimination as between Palestinian
and foreign investors.
2. Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions
Under TRIMS, each Member is obligated to eliminate quan-
titative restrictions affecting investment in goods,"3 4 including
restrictions on: (a) the importation by an enterprise of products
used in or related to its local production; (b) the importation by
an enterprise of products used in or related to its local produc-
tion by restricting its access to foreign exchange; or (c) the ex-
portation or sale for export by an enterprise of products. 2 5 The
Investment Law contains none of the quantitative restrictions
prohibited by TRIMS.
3. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment
GATS, but not TRIMS, contains the principle that, with re-
spect to any measure covered by GATS, each Member of GATT
must accord to services and service suppliers of any other Mem-
ber treatment no less favorable than it accords to like services
and service suppliers of any other country.2 36 The Investment
Law does not specifically contain a most-favored-nation principle
for investments in either goods or services. The Investment
Agency and PNA have not bound themselves to follow most-fa-
vored-nation practices in approving investments. The references
233. GATS, supra note 228, art. XVI, 33 I.L.M. at 60.
234. TRIMS, supra note 227, art. 2(1).
235. Id. annex (2).
236. GATS, supra note 228, art. 11(1), 33 I.L.M. at 49. GATS allows Members to
exempt specific measures from the most-favored-nation principle in an Annex. Id. art
11(2), 33 I.L.M. at 49. A Member may confer advantages, not available to other Mem-
bers of GATr, to adjacent countries in order to facilitate exchanges limited to contigu-
ous frontier zones of services that are both locally produced and consumed. Id. art.
11(3), 33 I.L.M. at 49.
1995]
582 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 19:529
in the Investment Law to investors in the Palestinian diaspora217
may in practice create favoritism towards such Palestinian inves-
tors. Such investors, however, may live in many different coun-
tries, making it difficult to sustain the argument that favoritism
for Palestinian diaspora investors violates the most-favored-na-
tion principle.
4. Payments and Transfers
GATS, but not TRIMS, states that a Member of GATT shall
not apply restrictions on international transfers and payments
for current transactions in those sectors where the Member
makes specific commitments.23 8 A Member of GATT may im-
pose restrictions on the free transferability of payments in the
event of a serious balance-of-payments inequity or external fi-
nancial difficulty.2 39 The requirement in the Investment Law
that investors pay certain, unspecified dues before repatriating
capital and profits24 ° may run into conflict with the principle
contained in Article XI of GATS if the dues are set at a level that
restricts or completely deters capital and profit transfers. High
dues on capital and profit transfers could be justified, however,
by the principle found in Article XII of GATS:
It is recognized that particular pressures on the balance of
payments of a Member in the process of economic develop-
ment or economic transition may necessitate the use of re-
strictions to ensure, inter alia, the maintenance of a level of
financial reserves adequate for the implementation of its pro-
gramme of economic development or economic transi-
tion.2 4 1
5. Transparency
Both TRIMS and GATS contain the transparency principle:
that measures affecting investment in goods, market access for
services, or the supply of services shall be made publicly avail-
237. See, e.g., Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.2-.5, Appendix at 608-09 (set-
ting forth several rights of expatriate Palestinians).
238. GATS, supra note 228, art. XI, 33 I.L.M. at 56. Article XI "assures the service
provider will be able to repatriate profits made in doing business in GATS Member
country." Yue, supra note 228, at 199.
239. GATS, supra note 228, art. XII, 33 I.L.M. at 56-57.
240. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.4, Appendix at 609.
241. GATS, supra note 228, art. XII, 33 I.L.M. at 56-57.
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able.24 2 The Investment Law recognizes the importance of trans-
parency by giving the Investment Agency the responsibility to
publicize information in order to promote investment in the Pal-
estinian Territories.243 The lack of transparency in many aspects
of the Investment Law, as already noted in Part III,2 4 raises the
question whether the Investment Law satisfies the transparency
principle as contained in TRIMS and GATS.
C. The Investment Law and World Bank Guidelines on Direct
Foreign Investment
In 1992, the Development Committee of the World Bank
adopted Guidelines on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment ("Guidelines") .245 The Guidelines are not rules of interna-
tional law,246 but they have been influential in the diplomacy
concerning the treatment of foreign investment by states.2 4 7 It is
instructive to see how the Investment Law compares to the prin-
ciples set forth in the Guidelines.
1. Admission
Article II of the Guidelines sets forth the principles on ad-
mitting foreign investments. 2 48  The Investment Law satisfies
Guideline II.'s principle that each state encourage foreign in-
vestment and Guideline 11.2(a)'s principle of facilitating the ad-
mission and establishment of investment by foreign nationals.2 4 9
The requirement in the Investment Law that a potential investor
first must obtain all necessary licenses and permits before seek-
ing approval from the Investment Agency2 50 could be considered
violative of Guideline 11.2(b)'s principle that unduly cumber-
some or complicated procedural regulations for the admission
242. TRIMS, supra note 227, art. 6; GATS, supra note 228, art. III, 33 I.L.M. at 49-
50.
243. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 4.2, 4.4, Appendix at 605.
244. See, e.g., supra notes 146-51, 157-66, 220 and accompanying text (discussing
Investment Law's lack of transparency).
245. The Guidelines are reprinted in IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA, THE LEGAL TREATMENT
OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE WORLD BANK GUIDELINES 155-64 (1993) [hereinafter
WORLD BANK GUIDELINES].
246. SORNARAJAH, supra note 202, at 212.
247. See WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, at 146-50; SORNARAJAH, supra
note 202, at 212.
248. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. II, at 157-58.
249. Id. arts. I1, 11.2(a), at 157.
250. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 13.1, Appendix at 607.
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of foreign investments should be avoided.251
Article 11.3 of the Guidelines cautions states that perform-
ance requirements as conditions of admission are counter-
productive because they discourage foreign investment or en-
courage evasion or corruption. 52 Since the Investment Law im-
poses no performance requirements for admission, it is in
accord with Article 11.3 of the Guidelines.
Article II.4 of the Guidelines allows a state to deviate from
the principle of free admission when a proposed investment is
inconsistent with clearly defined requirements of national secur-
ity or belongs to economic sectors reserved by law to nationals
on account of economic development objectives or the strict exi-
gencies of national interest.253 National security powers are be-
yond the competence of the PNA under the Cairo Agreement
and Interim Agreement, 254 but Article 21.2 of the Investment
Law does state that an investment will not be approved if it is in
conflict with public security.2 5 5 Article 21.2 does not, however,
clearly define the requirements of public security as required by
Guideline II.4(a). The Investment Law complies with Guideline
II.4(b) because it does not reserve any economic sectors for
Palestinians.
Guideline 11.5 states that restrictions applicable to national
investment on account of public policy (ordre public), public
health, and the protection of the environment will apply equally
to foreign investmentY56 Article 21.2 of the Investment Law re-
quires that investments not be in conflict with public morals,
public order, public security, and environmental protection
laws.2 57 Guideline 11.6 encourages states to publish adequate
and current information about laws, regulations, and procedures
affecting foreign investment.258 The Investment Law gives the
Investment Agency the power to publicize information in order
to promote investment in the Palestinian Territories,2 59 but the
251. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. II.2(b), at 157.
252. Id. art. 11.3, at 157.
253. Id. art. II.4, at 157.
254. See supra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing foreign affairs
problems inherent in Cairo Agreement and Interim Agreement).
255. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 21.2, Appendix at 610.
256. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. 11.5, at 158.
257. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 21.2, Appendix at 610.
258. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. 11.6, at 158.
259. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 4.2, Appendix at 605.
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PNA and Investment Agency might have a difficult time meeting
the principle in Guideline 11.6 given the current confused state
of Palestinian commercial law.
2. Treatment
Guidelines 111.2 and III.3(a) require states to extend to for-
eign investors fair and equitable treatment as favorable as that
accorded to national investors in similar circumstances.2 60 The
Investment Law contains the principle of non-discrimination,
which essentially grants foreign investors national treatment.
Guideline III.3(a) also requires that full protection and security
be accorded to the foreign investor's property rights, including
intellectual property.261 The PNA and Investment Agency might
have difficulty satisfying this Guideline, not because they want to
undermine a foreign investor's property rights, but because the
existing Palestinian law governing property rights is not as clear
and transparent as it needs to be. 6 2
Guideline III.3(b) requires that a state not discriminate
among foreign investors on grounds of nationality.2 63 The non-
discrimination principle in the Investment Law also proscribes
discrimination as between foreign investors.
21
Guideline 111.5(a) requires the state to issue promptly the
necessary licenses, permits, and concessions for the uninter-
rupted operation of the admitted investment.265 The Investment
Law's requirement that a potential investor acquire all necessary
licenses and permits before submitting an application to the In-
vestment Agency 266 seems counter to the principle embodied in
Guideline III.5(a). Guideline 111.5(b) requires the state to au-
thorize the investor to employ foreign personnel. 267 The Invest-
ment Law contains no prohibitions on the employment of for-
eign nationals. The employment thresholds of permanent Pales-
tinian employees established in the exemption benefit criteria
260. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, arts. 111.2, 111.3(a), at 158.
261. Id. art. 111.3(a), at 158.
262. Israel and the PNA have agreed to cooperate on developing "adequate pro-
tection of intellectual property rights" in the Interim Agreement. See Interim Agree-
ment, supra note 21, annex VI, art. VI(e).
263. WoRLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. III.3(b), at 158.
264. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.2, Appendix at 608-09.
265. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. 111.5(a), at 159.
266. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 13.1, Appendix at 607.
267. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. III.5(b), at 159.
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may indirectly restrict the hiring of foreign nationals, but such
thresholds do not prohibit an investor from retaining foreign
personnel.
Guideline 111.6 deals with the transfer of wages, net revenue,
debt payments, net sales proceeds, and compensation payments
for expropriation or under dispute settlement. 268 The Invest-
ment Law does not deal with the transferability of the wages of
foreign employees, the transfer of debt payments, or the transfer
of expropriation or dispute settlement compensation payments.
The Investment Law allows the foreign investor to transfer capi-
tal and profits after paying dues required by Palestinian law.269
Since "dues" are defined as customs duties and purchase
taxes,27 0 the Investment Law could be interpreted as in compli-
ance with Guideline I11.6(b) on the free transferability of net
revenues. If the dues required by the PNA are high, the Invest-
ment Law may indirectly deter the transferability of capital and
profits. The Investment Law might also violate the principle in
Guideline 111.6(1) (d), which requires the repatriation and trans-
fer of the net proceeds of a liquidation or sale of an invest-
ment.2 71 The only exception provided by Guideline 111.6(1) (a)
is that a state may require proceeds to be repatriated in install-
ments over a period not exceeding five years.272 The Investment
Law is silent as to whether an investor that sells its investment
may repatriate the sales proceeds.
Nothing in the Investment Law violates the principle in
Guideline 111.7, which requires each state to permit and facilitate
the reinvestment in its territory of the profits realized from ex-
isting investments and the proceeds of sale or liquidation of such
investment. 273
Guideline 111.8 requires the state to take appropriate meas-
ures to prevent and control corrupt business practices, to pro-
mote accountability and transparency in dealing with foreign in-
vestors, and to cooperate with other states in developing interna-
tional procedures and mechanisms to ensure the same. 74 The
268. Id. art. III.6, at 159-60.
269. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.5, Appendix at 609.
270. Id. art. 1, Appendix at 603.
271. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. III.6(1)(d), at 159-60.
272. Id. art. III.6(1)(a), at 159.
273. Id. art. 11.7, at 160.
274. Id. art. 111.8, at 160.
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Investment Law revokes approval of an investment and retroac-
tively requires the payment of all taxes and other economic ben-
efits from the initial date of approval if the Investment Agency
determines that an investment license was granted through false
pretense, deceit, bribery, or forgery.27 The Investment Law also
has provisions that address issues of accountability and trans-
parency. For example, the Investment Agency has the power
and responsibility to: (1) direct investment in accordance with
the Palestinian economic needs; (2) formulate information nec-
essary to publicize and promote investment in the Palestinian
Territories; (3) formulate recommendations on the improve-
ment of the Investment Law; and (4) collect and publish studies
encouraging investment in the Palestinian Territories.276 Much
of the Investment Law, however, does not contribute to the
transparency principle because it gives the Investment Agency
broad discretion to approve investments, change incentives, cre-
ate additional incentives, and cancel investment approvals. 277
Guideline 111.9 permits states to provide tax exemptions and
other fiscal incentives to foreign investors, provided that such
exemptions and incentives are automatically granted to the ex-
tent possible, directly linked to the type of activity to be en-
couraged, and equally extended to national investors in similar
circumstances. 27' The only exemptions that are automatic in the
Investment Law are the basic exemptions in Article 11.1, which
"shall be granted" after an investment proposal has been ap-
proved and all requisite licenses obtained.279 The Investment
Agency has total discretion to grant the additional exemptions
available in Articles 10.2, 10.3, 11.2, and 12,280 and such exemp-
tions may or may not be directly linked to the type of activity to
be encouraged and may or may not be equally extended to for-
eign investors as to Palestinians.
3. Expropriation and Termination of Contracts
The Investment Law provides that expropriation of any in-
275. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 19.2, Appendix at 609.
276. Id. art. 4, Appendix at 604-05.
277. See, e.g., id. arts. 10, 11, 12, 19, Appendix at 606-07, 609 (setting forth provi-
sions that contribute to lack of transparency).
278. WoRLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. 111.9, at 160-61.
279. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 11.1, Appendix at 606-07.
280. Id. arts. 10.2-.3, 11.2, 12, Appendix at 606, 607.
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vestment is forbidden without the consent of the investor unless
the expropriation is undertaken pursuant to a law or court rul-
ing and on a non-discriminatory basis.28 1 The Investment Law
does not mention any standards to govern compensation of the
investor in the event of an expropriation. Guideline IV.1 pro-
vides that a state may not expropriate except where expropria-
tion is done in accordance with applicable legal procedures, in
pursuance in good faith of a public purpose, without discrimina-
tion on the basis of nationality, and against the payment of ade-
quate, effective, and prompt compensation. 282 The Guidelines
provide definitions for adequate, effective, and prompt compen-
sation. 28" Arguably, the Investment Law's requirement that any
expropriation without the consent of the investor only occur
pursuant to a law or court ruling in a non-discriminatory fash-
ion 284 satisfies the Guideline's requirements for applicable legal
procedures, good faith pursuance of a public purpose, and non-
discrimination. What is missing from the Investment Law is any
commitment on the standard to govern compensation for expro-
priations.
Guideline IV. 11 applies the principle in effect for expropri-
ations (i.e., action in conformity with applicable legal proce-
dures, in good faith pursuance of a public purpose, without dis-
crimination on the basis of nationality, and against the payment
of adequate, prompt, and effective compensation) to unilateral
termination of contracts by a host state for non-commercial rea-
sons.2 5 The Investment Law does not address unilateral termi-
nation by the Investment Agency of an investment contract for
non-commercial reasons.
4. Dispute Settlement
Guideline V.1 requires that disputes between foreign inves-
tors and the host state normally be settled first through negotia-
tions and then through either national courts, conciliation, or
binding arbitration.286 The Guidelines encourage the use of the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
281. Id. art. 18.1, Appendix at 608.
282. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, arts. IV.2, IV.3, at 161.
283. Id. arts. IV.3-IV.8, at 161-63.
284. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.1, Appendix at 608.
285. WORLD BANK GUIDELINES, supra note 245, art. IV. 11, at 163-64.
286. Id. art. V.1, at 164.
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("ICSID") for independent arbitration. 87 The Investment Law
states that disputes between an investor and the Investment
Agency shall be resolved by Palestinian courts in accordance
with Palestinian law.288 A major exception to this dispute settle-
ment provision is the requirement that the President of the PNA
personally decide appeals by investors who have had their ap-
provals canceled by the Investment Agency.2 19 This particular
provision of the Investment Law conflicts with Guideline V.1's
requirement for access to judicial review. The Investment Law
also seems to preclude the use of binding international arbitra-
tion as a dispute settlement mechanism, which Guideline V.1 en-
courages.29 o
D. The Investment Law and the U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty
A final comparison is between the Investment Law and the
principles contained in the model U.S. Bilateral Investment
Treaty. The United States and European capital-exporting
countries have developed bilateral treaty programs that promote
the protection of foreign investment.2 91 European capital-ex-
porting countries have concluded more than 400 bilateral invest-
ment protection agreements. 92 As ofJune 15, 1994, the United
States had concluded thirty bilateral investment treaties, of
which seventeen had entered into force." The model U.S. Bi-
287. Id. art. V.3, at 164.
288. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 20, Appendix at 609.
289. Id. art. 19.3, Appendix at 609.
290. See id. art. 20, Appendix at 609 ("Palestinian courts shall have the competence
and jurisdiction to resolve all disputes") (emphasis added).
291. Todd S. Shenkin, Comment, Trade-Related Investment Measures in Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and the GATT: Moving Towards a Multilateral Investment Treaty, 55 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 541, 548 (1994). For an analysis of bilateral investment treaties, see gener-
ally Siqueiros, supra note 208. For a list of the investment treaties on record as of May
15, 1994, see Status of Investment Treaties, 33 I.L.M. 833 (1994).
292. Shenkin, supra note 291, at 548.
293. Eleanor R. Lewis, The United States Bilateral Investment Treaty Program: Protection
for U.S. Investors Overseas, in THE COMMERCE DEPARTMENT SPEAKS ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND INVESTMENT 1994, at 127, 132 (PLI Corporate Law and Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B-863, 1994). For a detailed discussion of the history of the U.S.
bilateral treaty program, see Kenneth J. Vandevelde, US. Bilateral Investment Treaties:
The Second Wave, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 621 (1993); K. Scott Gudgeon, United States Bilat-
eral Investment Treaties: Comments on Their Origin, Purposes, and General Treatment Stan-
dards, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAw. 105 (1986). A general discussion of bilateral investment
treaties can be found in SORNARAJAH, supra note 202, at 225-76.
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lateral Investment Treaty ("U.S. Investment Treaty") 294 was se-
lected for comparison rather than European examples because:
(1) the U.S. Investment Treaty incorporates the principle of na-
tional treatment for the establishment of investments2 9 while
European investment treaties usually do not;2 96 (2) the U.S. In-
vestment Treaty prohibits the imposition of performance re-
quirements as a condition for the establishment, expansion, or
maintenance of investments,2 97 a prohibition not typically found
in European investment treaties;298 and (3) the U.S. Department
of Commerce revised the U.S. Investment Treaty in 1994,99
making it an up-to-date document against which to compare the
Investment Law.
Article II(1) of the U.S. Investment Treaty provides that
each party shall accord to investors of the other party the more
favorable of national treatment or most-favored-nation treat-
ment.3 0 0 As already mentioned, the Investment Law provides for
national treatment but not for most-favored-nation treatment of
foreign investors. 31  Article II(3)(a) of the U.S. Investment
Treaty states that each party shall at all times accord to covered
investments fair and equitable treatment and full protection and
security, and shall in no case accord treatment less favorable
than that required by international law.10 2 The Investment Law
contains no language similar to Article I(3) (a) of the U.S. In-
vestment Treaty, the closest being the Investment Law's princi-
ple of non-discrimination. 3
Article 11(3) (b) of the U.S Investment Treaty provides that
neither party can impair by unreasonable or discriminatory
measures the management, conduct, operation, sale, or other
294. The text of the U.S. Investment Treaty can be found in Lewis, supra note 293,
at 133-53.
295. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. 11(1), Lewis, supra note 293, at 136-37.
296. Shenkin, supra note 291, at 548-49.
297. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. VI, Lewis, supra note 293, at 141-42.
298. Shenkin, supra note 291, at 549.
299. Lewis, supra note 293, at 130.
300. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. 11(1), Lewis, supra note 293, at 136-37. Article
11(2) allows each side to adopt and maintain exemptions to the principles in Article
11(1). Id. at 137.
301. See supra notes 236-37 and accompanying text (discussing most-favored-nation
features of Investment Law).
302. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. 11(3) (a), Lewis, supra note 293, at 137.
303. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.2, Appendix at 608-09.
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disposition of covered investments.304 Since the Investment Law
focuses on the investment approval process rather than the oper-
ation of an approved investment, it does not address most of the
concerns of Article 11(3) (b) of the U.S. Investment Treaty. Many
of the laws and regulations that will govern the conduct of busi-
ness in the Palestinian Territories in the future have not, how-
ever, been promulgated (e.g., health and environmental protec-
tion laws) and foreign investors will closely watch how new Pales-
tinian laws affect the operation of an investment. Finally, the
discretion given to the Investment Agency to approve asset sales
is not subject to any standards or parameters in the Investment
Law,"0 5 which leaves open the possibility that such discretion
could be used in an unreasonable and discriminatory manner.
Article 11(4) of the U.S. Investment Treaty states that each
party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and en-
forcing rights with respect to covered investments.30 6 The Invest-
ment Law would not satisfy Article 11(4) of the U.S. Investment
Treaty because an investor has no effective way of asserting a
claim that its investment approval was wrongfully canceled.
More specifically, an investor has no recourse against the deci-
sion of the President of the PNA.3 07 Further, Article 11(5) of the
U.S. Investment Treaty contains the transparency principle,0 8
and the lack of transparency in the Investment Law has already
been noted. 0 9
Article III of the U.S. Investment Treaty contains the stan-
dard for legitimate expropriations of covered investments: ex-
propriations must only be undertaken for a public purpose in a
non-discriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, ade-
quate, and effective compensation and in accordance with due
process of law and the general principles of treatment provided
for in Article II(3) .310 As mentioned earlier, the Investment Law
arguably would satisfy the public purpose requirement because
an expropriation without the consent of the investor must be
304. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. 11(3) (b), Lewis, supra note 293, at 137.
305. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 16, Appendix at 608.
306. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. 11(4), Lewis, supra note 293, at 138.
307. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 19.3, Appendix at 609.
308. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. 11(5), Lewis, supra note 293, at 138.
309. See, e.g., supra notes 146-51, 157-66, 220, 277 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing lack of transparency in Investment Law).
310. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. III, Lewis, supra note 293, at 138.
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made pursuant to a law or court ruling.311 The Investment Law
also requires expropriations in a non-discriminatory manner,312
which would satisfy another requirement of Article III(1) of the
U.S. Investment Treaty. The Investment Law does not, however,
address the standard for compensation; and it is unlikely that
the PNA would argue that "prompt, adequate, and effective com-
pensation" would be the proper standard to apply. Finally, the
question whether the Investment Law provides investors with the
right to assert and make a claim generated by Article 11(4) of the
U.S. Investment Treaty comes up again in relation to U.S. Invest-
ment Treaty Article III(1)'s requirement for due process of law
and treatment under the principles of Article 11(3).
Article IV of the U.S. Investment Treaty provides that each
party shall: (a) accord national and most-favored-nation treat-
ment to covered investments as regards any measure relating to
losses that investments suffer in its territory owing to war or
other armed conflict, revolution, civil disturbance, or similar
event,313 and (b) accord restitution, or pay compensation in ac-
cordance with the provisions of Article III in the event that the
losses referred to in (a) result from requisition or destruction of
the investments by the party in question.14 While the level of
political instability in the Palestinian Territories makes the issues
implicated by Article IV of the U.S. Investment Treaty relevant,
the Investment Law does not address them in any way.
Article V(1) and (2) of the U.S. Investment Treaty deal with
transfers relating to a covered investment and require that such
transfers be made freely, without delay, and in freely usable cur-
rency.3 1 5 A party may prevent a transfer only through the equita-
ble, non-discriminatory, and good faith application of bank-
ruptcy, securities, and criminal laws or of orders or judgments
from adjudicatory proceedings.3 1 6 The discretion given to the
Investment Agency to approve asset transfers317 is not implicated
by Article V, because Article V deals only with the transfer of the
proceeds from the sale of all or any part of an investment and
311. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.1, Appendix at 608.
312. Id.
313. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. IV(1), Lewis, supra note 293, at 139.
314. Id. art. IV(2), at 138-39.
315. Id. arts. V(1)-(2), at 140-41.
316. Id. art. V(4), at 141.
317. Investment Law, supra note 109, arts. 15, 16, Appendix at 608.
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not with the approval of a sale of assets. The silence of the In-
vestment Law as to the transferability of the proceeds from the
sale of an entire investment might be problematic in connection
to the above standard of free transferability enshrined in Article
V of the U.S. Investment Treaty. 18 If the taxes and dues applica-
ble to the repatriation of profits and capital from investment in
the Palestinian Territories3 19 are onerous enough to deter effec-
tively such transfers, then the Investment Law and its associated
regulations could be considered at odds with the free transfer
principle of Article V of the U.S. Investment Treaty.
Article VI of the U.S. Investment Treaty prohibits each party
from mandating or enforcing conditions on investments that re-
quire local content utilization, limit imports, require exports,
limit sales, require technology transfers, or require research and
development activities.3 20 The Investment Law does not contain
any of the restrictions prohibited by Article VI of the U.S. Invest-
ment Treaty.
Article VII(1) of the U.S. Investment Treaty requires each
party to allow nationals of the other party to enter and remain in
its territory for purposes of working with an investment, subject
to such party's immigration laws.3 21 Article VII(2) requires each
party to permit covered investments to engage managerial per-
sonnel, regardless of nationality.3 22 The Investment Law states
that expatriate Palestinian investors, Arab investors, and other
foreign investors shall enjoy the right of permanent residence
under Palestinian law.
323
Article IX of the U.S. Investment Treaty addresses dispute
settlement.32 4 The key principle of Article IX is that the investor,
rather than the host government, has the choice of submitting
investment disputes to local courts, agreed alternative dispute
settlement procedures, or arbitration by ICSID.3 21 The Invest-
ment Law does not allow the investor a choice in the selection of
a dispute settlement forum. Disputes have to be submitted to
318. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. V, Lewis, supra note 293, at 140-41.
319. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.4, Appendix at 609.
320. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. VI, Lewis, supra note 293, at 141-42.
321. Id. art. VII(1), at 142-43.
322. Id. art. VII(2), at 143.
323. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 18.3, Appendix at 609.
324. U.S. Investment Treaty, art. IX, Lewis, supra note 293, at 144-45.
325. Id. arts. IX(2) and (3), at 144-45.
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Palestinian courts3 26 unless the dispute concerns cancellation of
investment approval, in which case the problem comes before
the President of the PNA for final resolution.3 2 7
E. Summary of Analysis
Analyzing the Investment Law against the trends in foreign
investment laws and the principles contained in TRIMS, GATS,
the Guidelines, and the U.S. Investment Treaty demonstrates
that the Investment Law has serious problems that preclude it
from being in conformity with the latest international practices
and standards on foreign investment. The problems appear fre-
quently in the analysis: broad discretionary powers; a lack of
transparency; restrictions on asset sales; potential problems with
the free transferability of investment sale proceeds, asset sale
proceeds, capital, and profits; a lack of standards for expropria-
tion; and a flawed dispute settlement procedure. It is disturbing
that the Investment Law fails to meet current international stan-
dards and practices, given the desperate need for foreign invest-
ment in the Palestinian Territories. In analyzing the legal struc-
ture for foreign investment present in Gaza and the West Bank
before the adoption of the Investment Law, Keith Molkner and
Ra'ed Abdul Hamid of IPCRI argued that legal structure was in-
adequate, inter alia, because: (1) there was too much discretion
in the investment approval process; (2) the free transferability of
capital and profits abroad was not guaranteed; (3) benefits could
be retroactively canceled and severe penalties imposed without
reference to objective standards and without adequate legal re-
course against such a decision; (4) the lack of protection against
expropriation and no standard of compensation; and (5) there
was inadequate access to international arbitration as a dispute
settlement mechanism .3 2  The appearance of the very same
problems in the Investment Law is discouraging and indicates
that the Investment Law does not resolve many of the problems
plaguing the prior legal regime on foreign investment in the Pal-
estinian Territories.
326. Investment Law, supra note 109, art. 20, Appendix at 609.
327. Id. art. 19.3, Appendix at 609.
328. See Molkner & Hamid, supra note 92, at 33-38 (discussing legal regime apply-
ing to foreign investment in Palestinian Territories before Investment Law).
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V. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN INVESTMENT
AFTER THE INVESTMENT LAW
The Investment Law will not have a significant short-term
impact on foreign private investment in the Palestinian Territo-
ries and, thus, on the economic development of the Palestinian
economy. This lack of impact can be traced to political, legal,
and economic obstacles.
A. Political Obstacles
As noted earlier, the political violence that has accompa-
nied the peace process has deterred foreign private investors,
and the Investment Law is not designed to deal directly with the
political issues at the heart of such violence. Some commenta-
tors are arguing that the violence haunting the peace process
threatens to destroy it. Amos Perlmutter argues in the May/June
1995 issue of Foreign Affairs that the Declaration "is for all intents
and purposes dead" and that "the whole Oslo process is unravel-
ling, jolted by a wave of fundamentalist terrorism that deepens
the prevailing pessimism among even dovish Israelis." 29 Such
gloomy predictions, if not proven accurate in the event, certainly
inject chilling doubt into the minds of potential foreign private
investors. The signing of the Interim Agreement in late Septem-
ber 1995 steadied the peace process somewhat as both sides took
another step towards peace. The assassination of Israeli Prime
Minister Yitzhak Rabin on November 4, 1995, has, however,
shaken the peace process and increased doubts in Israel, the Pal-
estinian Territories, and elsewhere about the long-term pros-
pects for peace. 330 Much political uncertainty remains, there-
fore, particularly with the approach of elections in both the Pal-
estinian Territories and Israel in 1996. The peace process will
undoubtedly undergo more severe stress and strain in the fu-
ture, forcing foreign investors to think very hard before putting
money into the Palestinian Territories. The "wait and see"
mentality may continue to prevail to the detriment of Palestinian
economic development.
329. Amos Perlmutter, The Israel-PLO Accord is Dead, FoREIGN A"t., May/June 1995,
at 59.
330. See, e.g., Israel After Rabin: The Impossible Decision, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 11, 1995, at
23 (discussing problems in Israel confronting peace process after Rabin's assassina-
tion).
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B. Legal Obstacles
The legal status of the Investment Law under the peace pro-
cess agreements is not certain, which raises the question whether
the PNA can in fact implement it. Article IX of the Economic
Protocol states that the "Palestinian side has the right to employ
various methods in encouraging and promoting the develop-
ment of the Palestinian industry by way of providing grants,
loans, research and development assistance and direct-tax bene-
fits."' This provision suggests that the Economic Protocol em-
powers the PNA to draft and adopt the Investment Law. Israel
has expressed the view that economic development in the Pales-
tinian Territories is crucial to the peace process and has en-
couraged the PNA to establish institutions and procedures to fos-
ter economic development. Further, Article VI of the Cairo
Agreement and Article IX(5) of the Interim Agreement give the
PNA the power to conduct diplomacy and negotiations with
states and international organizations specifically in the eco-
nomic development area.3 ' While the Investment Law is not an
international agreement, its provisions dealing with foreign in-
vestors are well within the authority of the PNA to work on the
international level towards economic development.
Article VII of the Cairo Agreement contains several techni-
cal uncertainties regarding the PNA's legislative powers. All leg-
islation promulgated by the PNA will have to be submitted for
review to the Legislation Subcommittee of the Joint Civil Affairs
Coordination and Cooperation Committee.3 3 The Legislation
Subcommittee will then determine whether the legislation sub-
mitted for review exceeds the jurisdiction of the PNA or is other-
wise inconsistent with the provisions of the Cairo Agreement.
Legislation that is not sent through the process provided in Arti-
cle VII will not enter into force under the terms of the Cairo
Agreement. As of this writing, the Investment Law has not been
submitted to the Legislation Subcommittee, which technically
means that it is not in force and cannot be implemented by the
PNA under the terms of the Cairo Agreement. Builders for
331. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, annex IV, art. IX(2)(a), 33 I.L.M. at 715;
Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex V, art. IX(2) (a).
332. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, art. VI, 33 I.L.M. at 630; Interim Agreement,
supra note 21, art. IX(5).
333. Cairo Agreement, supra note 20, art. VII, 33 I.L.M. at 631.
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Peace has been informed that the Investment Law will not go
before the Legislation Subcommittee because this sort of legisla-
tion was not intended to undergo the review process.334 While
this practice is reassuring in one respect to a foreign investor, in
another respect it is disconcerting because the parties are deviat-
ing from the letter of the Cairo Agreement without clear guide-
lines to clarify what laws will go before the Legislation Subcom-
mittee. This technical uncertainty could be overcome by having
the elected Palestinian Council ratify the Investment Law under
the powers it has pursuant to the Interim Agreement, but such a
solution involves more delay in implementing a Palestinian in-
vestment regime.
Such a delay is very likely since it appears that the PNA will
not implement the Investment Law until the Palestinian Council
ratifies it sometime after the Palestinian elections in 1996.33 5
Whether the Palestinian Council decides to revise the Invest-
ment Law during ratification remains to be seen.
Another legal obstacle is that the Palestinian Council will
have to set up the Investment Agency, appoint its personnel, and
draft and implement regulations to fill in or interpret the Invest-
ment Law, to clarify ambiguities, to reduce the discretionary
powers of the Investment Agency, and to improve the trans-
parency of the Investment Law. The length of time the PLO and
PNA took to draft the Investment Law does not bode well for
prompt establishment of the Investment Agency and an efficient
drafting and promulgation of needed regulations.3 3 6
C. Economic Obstacles
Foreign private investment continues to face short term eco-
nomic obstacles that will prevent it from contributing signifi-
candy to the economic development of the Palestinian Territo-
ries. First, the interdependence between public aid and private
investment has still not been generated because international
aid has been slow in flowing and infrastructure projects slower in
334. Telephone interview with Basil Kiwan, Director of Business Development,
Builders for Peace (July 20, 1995).
335. Telephone interview with Joe DeSutter, Executive Director, Builders for
Peace (Nov. 2i, 1995).
336. The PNA claims that "[r]egulations are presenly being drafted to clarify and
facilitate the administrative procedures of the Law." INVEST IN PALESTINE: LAWS, supra
note 90, at 11.
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finishing. The private sector - the long-term heart of Palestin-
ian economic development - needs infrastructure improve-
ments in order to plant deep roots in the Palestinian Territo-
ries. 337 Whether the international donor community succeeds in
preparing the soil for private. sector roots remains an unan-
swered question.
Second, the reluctance of OPIC to fund loans to American
private investors despite, the fanfare, rhetoric, and promises of
the U.S. Government to support Palestinian economic develop-
ment is sending chilling signals to the international community
and the Palestinians. Without American leadership, the interna-
tional business community will proceed with ever more caution
and delay.
Third, the strategy of Builders for Peace, the group leading
U.S. private investment initiatives, may have inadvertently hurt
the prospects for foreign investment in the Palestinian Territo-
ries. The high-profile statements about investor interest and the
public announcements of large-scale projects have come back to
haunt Builders for Peace as the interest has not materialized and
most of the announced projects have not progressed. The strat-
egy may have backfired for a number of reasons. First, the eco-
nomic infrastructure to be funded by international aid has not
been built because of the problems between the PLO and the
international donor community. Publicly announcing big invest-
ment projects without any progress on building economic infra-
structure has created, in Mel Levine's words, "a fear that we are
putting the cart before the horse."3 3 8 Second, the flagship pro-
ject of Builders for Peace, the Gaza Marriott Hotel, appears out
of touch with the overwhelming need in the Palestinian Territo-
ries for basic economic development. The one Builders for
Peace project that has succeeded, the Bucheit International ce-
ment plant, produces a product directly connected to the infra-
structure development needs of the Palestinians. While not as
flashy as a five-star luxury hotel, the cement plant perhaps repre-
sents a better investment project model: smaller investments fo-
337. At the September 12, 1994 press conference announcing the nine Builders
for Peace investment projects, Sabri El-Farra, one of the investors, said: "We are talking
about a lot of fancy stuff here [the investment projects]. But unless we address the
infrastructure in Gaza... none of this will ever get off the ground." Shalit, supra note
46, at 14 (quoting Sabri EI-Farra).
338. Shalit, supra note 46, at 15 (quoting Mel Levine).
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cused on existing capabilities to service the creation of an eco-
nomic infrastructure. The failure, or perceived failure, of the
Builders for Peace strategy may deter investors from pursuing
investments akin to the cement plant.
Fourth, serious questions exist about whether the tradi-
tional strategy of providing investment procedures and incen-
tives through an investment law will contribute to Palestinian
economic development given the current state of the Palestinian
economy. Massive unemployment, poor infrastructure, total de-
pendence on the Israeli economy, no geographic or natural re-
source advantage over neighboring states, and the problems with
international aid funds all combine to make a grim picture.
Other economic development ideas have been advanced to deal
with the troubling state of the Palestinian economy. As James
Zogby, Co-President of Builders for Peace, has said: "A new ap-
proach must be found. 3 39 The most popular idea currently is
the "industrial estate" or "enterprise zone" concept, in which Is-
raelis and Palestinians form special zones in the Palestinian Ter-
ritories to encourage rapid economic growth. Twenty-two U.S.
senators wrote to President Clinton on May 25, 1995, urging the
Clinton Administration to support the rapid development of an
industrial park in Gaza and the West Bank.340 Builders for Peace
supports the industrial zone concept, 4 ' and President Clinton
has indicated he would "ask Congress to approve duty-free treat-
ment of goods from special industrial zones on-the West Bank
and Gaza, if Israel and the Palestinians agreed to create the
zones."34 2 The Interim Agreement incorporates the industrial
zone idea as Israel and the PLO have agreed to cooperate to
"seek ways to increase Palestinian industrial output through, in-
ter alia, the promotion of a program of industrial zones."343 If
pursued, the industrial zone concept could make the traditional
foreign private investment strategy embodied in the Investment
Law secondary in importance. Once industrial zones have
339. Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of James Zogby).
340. Id. (opening statement of Chairman, Senator Hank Brown).
341. Id. (testimony of'James Zogby).
342. Paul F. Horvitz, Israel Moves with PLO to Stage Voting in West Bank, INT'L HER-
ALD TIUB., Feb. 13, 1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File. Such duty-free
treatment of Palestinian goods will now fall under the anticipated U.S.-Palestinian free
trade agreement.
343. Interim Agreement, supra note 21, annex VI, art. V(d).
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gained a foothold, the Investment Law could find a place in at-
tracting foreign investment to service and expand the growth fa-
cilitated by industrial zones. The industrial zone strategy em-
bodies the conclusion that the Palestinian economy cannot in its
current condition rely on traditional foreign investment to jump
start economic development.
Fifth, the problems facing foreign investors in the Palestin-
ian Territories and the presence of attractive investment oppor-
tunities elsewhere in the region and in the world suggest that
investors pursuing Palestinian investment projects have strong
non-economic motivations, such as helping Palestinian self-de-
termination and the peace process. Perhaps this explains the
leading role Palestinians in the diaspora have taken in encourag-
ing and participating in investments in the Palestinian Territo-
ries. 3 4 4 Expatriate Palestinian investors have also been some of
the harshest critics of the PNA and Arafat's governing style.3 45
Sixth, the division within the Palestinian community be-
tween the supporters of the peace process and the supporters of
fundamentalist Islamic groups portends long-term trouble for
the role of foreign investment in the economic development of
the Palestinian Territories. Amy Chua has identified in Latin
American and Southeast Asian countries a cycle of privatization
and nationalization driven by economic forces and ethnicity. 346
The period in the cycle of privatization and openness to foreign
investors is driven by need for foreign investment to promote
domestic economic development. 347 The period in the cycle of
nationalization and hostility towards foreign investors is driven
by nationalism. 48 Interestingly, Chua shows that the national-
ism is not only directed externally against foreigners,349 but also
344. See Warmed Up with Nowhere to Run, supra note 226, at 11 (discussing the lead-
ership in Palestinian private sector activities shown by the Palestine Development &
Investment Company); Middle East Summit: Public Ventures, Private Doubts, supra note 81,
at 48 (reporting new US$250 million foreign private investment program developed by
Palestinian expatriates in Qatar).
345. See Suleiman AI-Khalidi, Palestinian Investors Set Terms for Aid to Arafat, Reuters,
May 31, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (discussing influential ex-
patriate Palestinian businessmen's criticisms of Arafat and demands for investment laws
protective of investors' money).
346. Amy L. Chua, The Privatization - Nationalization Cycle: The Link Between Markets
and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 225, 303 (1995).
347. Id. at 223-24.
348. Id. at 262.
349. Id. at 263.
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internally against ethnic groups within the state.3 50 The pressing
need for economic development combined with a divided com-
munity creates the potential for Palestinian oscillation between:
(1) openness to foreign investment and those leaders in favor of
it; and (2) hostility to foreign influences and the persons at-
tempting to import them. The nationalistic part of this cycle
would be driven not by ethnic tensions but by religious fac-
tors.351 The continued popularity of fundamentalist groups like
Hamas among Palestinians mightjeopardize the PNA's efforts to
place the Palestinian Territories permanently into the main-
stream of the international economic system.
Finally, the question remains whether the Palestinian Terri-
tories can develop a healthy and viable economy. The assump-
tion of the leaders involved in the peace process, and one of the
core premises of the entire process, is that the Palestinian econ-
omy can and will develop to support the basic needs and future
aspirations of the Palestinian people. The chosen strategy, as
outlined earlier, combines continued integration with the Israeli
economy and massive amounts of foreign public aid and private
investment. Some observers note that this strategy condemns
the Palestinians to dependence on Israel and the West.352 Such
dependence could feed resentment about the peace process and
increase the power of radical nationalist and/or fundamentalist
groups.
Arafat's warnings to the World Bank and the international
donor community about the "humiliating" conditions for receiv-
ing aid indicates that dependence is already creating political
problems for the PNA.s53 Arafat has said that the Palestinian
Territories have the potential to be either as economically vi-
350. Id. at 266.
351. Historical precedent exists in the Islamic world for an internationalist- funda-
mentalist cycle. Iran, under the Shah, was open to Western investment and influence,
but the revolution led by Khomeini effectively closed, for religious reasons, Iranian soci-
ety to Western investment influences. Now Iran is trying to attract foreign investment
and trade to help its economy. See, e.g., Sarvenaz Bahar, Khomeinism, The Islamic Republic
of Iran, and International Law: The Relevance of Islamic Political Ideology, 33 HAyv. INT'L L.J.
145, 185 (1992). The presence of strong fundamentalist forces in Iran, however, casts a
shadow on the attempt by Iranian officials to convince foreign investors that Iran is
"open for business." See, e.g., Lamis Andoni, Second Revolution Brews in Iran, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Apr. 12, 1995, at 6 (discussing riots by Iranian merchants and poor peo-
ple in protest of President Rafsanjani's free-market economic reforms).
352. See Avineri, supra note 26, at 12-13.
353. See Ibrahim, supra note 58.
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brant as Singapore or as economically desolate as Somalia.354 A
third possibility exists, according to Shlomo Avineri, who argues
that continued dependence by Palestinians on Israel creates the
possibility that a "virtual Bantustan would develop on Israel's
doorstep."3 55 Avineri recommends that the Palestinians build
their economy "with as few links to Israel as possible" and with
aid and investment primarily from Arab states rather than the
United States and the European Union.356 The peace process is,
however, pursuing exactly the opposite strategy. Foreign private
investors analyzing the long-term viability of the Palestinian Ter-
ritories will factor in the political, social, and economic conse-
quences of Palestinian economic dependence.
CONCLUSION
The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians will
remain a difficult endeavor. The lack of significant foreign pri-
vate investment in the Palestinian Territories will make the en-
deavor more difficult because foreign private investment is con-
sidered vital for Palestinian economic development. The Invest-
ment Law will do little to attract foreign private investment
because it leaves many important questions unanswered and cre-
ates potential problems for foreign investors. Other forces and
events beyond the scope and control of the Investment Law will
ultimately determine its relevance; but, in its present form, the
Investment Law falls short of what is needed to encourage for-
eign investors to build and profit from peace in the Palestinian
Territories.
354. Hearings, supra note 67 (testimony of Mel Levine).
355. Avineri, supra note 26, at 13. The term "Bantustan" historically referred to
the black homelands established in South Africa during the apartheid regime.
Although these black homelands nominally had independence, they were completely
dependent on South Africa economically.
356. Id. at 14. Avineri's alternative approach to economic development for the
Palestinians is not a rejection of economic dependence per se. He appears to believe
that the Palestinians are better off dependent on Arab states than on Israel and the
West. Id. at 14-15. Perhaps he believes that cultural and religious identity will make
economic dependence on Arab states more palatable for Palestinians. The problem
with grounding economic development strategy on cultural or religious terms is that it
encourages division rather than community between Israel and the Palestinians.
INVESTMENT IN PALESTINE
APPENDIX
LAW ON THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF INVESTMENT
Having the approval of the Council of the Palestinian National Author-
ity dated April 29, 1995, and in accordance with the public interest, the
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation
Organization and the President of the Palestinian National Authority
hereby promulgates the following law:
PART I
Definitions
Article 1
In this Law, the following words and expressions shall have the mean-
ings shown below, unless the context otherwise requires:
The Authority:
The Agency:
Investor:
Investment:
Dues:
Income Tax:
The Palestinian National Authority
The Palestinian Higher Agency for the
Encouragement of Investment.
Any natural or legal person seeking or
offering to invest in Palestine.
Creation or addition of economic activities
(production, industrial, tourist,
agricultural, medical, educational,
productive, construction services) in
Palestine, including:
(a) Establishing new projects.
(b) Adding new schemes of production
and new machinery which results in
increasing employment and
production.
Customs duties and purchase tax levied on
machinery, equipment and raw materials.
Income tax levied on the net profit of
investment projects.
PART II
The Palestinian Higher Agency for the Encouragement of Investment
Article 2
1. A public agency known as "The Palestinian Higher Agency for the
Encouragement of Investment" shall be established under the pro-
visions of this Law. It shall be an autonomous body corporate and
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shall report directly to the President of the Authority. The head-
quarters of the Agency shall temporarily be located in the city of
Gaza, and its Board of Directors may establish branches or offices
inside or outside Palestine.
2. The Agency shall be concerned with encouragement of investment
so as to ensure implementation of the Palestinian economic devel-
opment needs in accordance with the objectives, priorities, and
policies set by the Board.
Article 3
1. The Agency shall be managed by a Board of Directors composed
of 15 members under the chairmanship of the Minister of Eco-
nomics, Trade, and Industry. Membership shall consist of follow-
ing:
1. Director-General of the Agency.
2. A representative of the Ministry of Finance.
3. A representative of the Ministry of Planning and Interna-
tional Cooperation.
4. A representative of the Ministry of Industry.
5. A representative of the Ministry of Public Works.
6. A representative of the Ministry of Housing.
7. A representative of the Ministry of Local Government.
8. The Governor of the Palestinian Monetary Authority.
9. The Presidents of both the Federation of Chambers of Com-
merce and Industry.
10. Four members from the private sector, who shall be ap-
pointed by decision of the President of the National Author-
ity.
11. A representative of the concerned Ministry, depending on
the project(s) proposed.
2. Other ministries and agencies shall be represented by undersecre-
taries or general directors. Membership shall be for a renewable
term of three years. If the seat of a member of the Board of Direc-
tors falls vacant, whoever has the right to appoint such a member
shall appoint a substitute for the remainder of the term of mem-
bership.
3. The Agency shall be chaired by the representative of the Ministry
of Finance in the absence of Agency's chairman.
Article 4
The Agency shall have the following powers and functions:
1. To direct investments according to the approved priorities and
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polices based on the Palestinian economic needs and in coopera-
tion with the Ministry of Economics, Trade, and Industry, and
other concerned ministries.
2. To formulate and develop information packages to inform the In-
vestor about available opportunities and to promote such opportu-
nities by various mass media.
3. To formulate suggestions to improve and develop this Law when
necessary.
4. To collect, coordinate and publish studies on the encouragement
of local, Arab and foreign capital investment in various projects,
and to contact agencies for the promotion of investment.
5. To hold economic conferences, and invite Palestinian, Arab and
foreign investors, to participate.
Article 5
The Board of Directors shall have all the powers to conduct the busi-
ness of the Agency and to formulate its general policy in a manner
consistent with the objectives and functions provided for in this Law.
Article 6
1. Decisions of the Board of Directors shall be adopted by a majority
vote of those present. The Chairman shall have the deciding vote
in case of a tie. The quorum of the Board's meeting shall be the
presence of two-thirds of the number of members.
2. The Board of Directors shall meet at least once a month or when-
ever so required at the convocation of the Chairman, or at the
request of one-third of the members.
3. The Chairman or any member of the Board of Directors shall not
participate in any decisions related directly or indirectly to the in-
terests of that member.
4. The Board of Directors may invite any person, without having the
right to vote, to attend its meetings if there is a need to render an
interpretation or consultation.
Article 7
The Agency shall have Director-General, who shall be appointed by
Authority's President.
Article 8
The Agency shall have an annual budget with revenues derived from:
1. Contributions of the Palestinian National Authority;
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2. Service fees as determined by the Board of Directors; and
3. Donations and grants that do not contradict public interest.
Article 9
The Agency's Board of Directors shall appoint auditors to audit the
accounts in conformity with generally accepted practices and submit a
financial report to the President of the Authority every six months.
PART HI
Development Areas and Sectors
Article 10
1. The development areas under the jurisdiction of Palestinian Na-
tional Authority shall be divided into regions (A), (B) and (C) de-
pending on their nature and relevant economic policies. The
Agency shall designate and announce these regions pursuant to a
decree to be published in the Official Gazette.
2. The Agency's Board of Directors may change the classification of
the aforementioned development regions and specify appropriate
incentives for each region. The investor shall have the right to
object to the decision, but classification changes shall not apply to
enterprises that have already been approved.
3. The Agency's Board of Directors may grant additional exemptions
to specific economic investments required to promote the interests
of the Palestinian national economy.
PART IV
Exemptions
Article 11
1. Projects which are approved by the Agency and which have ob-
tained the requisite licenses in accordance with the applicable
laws, shall be granted the exemptions provided for under this Law
in conformity with following criteria:
Category (A): A project with paid-up capital of more than five
hundred thousand US Dollars ($500,000) or which perma-
nently employs no fewer than 25 Palestinian workers, shall be
granted an exemption from income taxes and from duties for
a period of five years, provided that the life of the economic
project is not less than ten years.
Category (B): A project with paid-up capital of more than one
hundred and fifty thousand US Dollars ($150,000) or which
permanently employs no fewer than 15 Palestinian workers
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shall be granted an exemption from income taxes and from
duties for a period of three years, provided that the life of the
economic project is not less than six years.
Category (C): A project with paid-up capital of more than one
hundred thousand US Dollars ($100,000) or which perma-
nently employs no fewer than 10 Palestinian workers shall be
granted an exemption from income taxes and from duties for
a period of two years, provided that the life of the economic
project is not less than five years.
Category (D): The Agency's Board of Directors may grant excep-
tional exemptions to a project with a paid-up capital of more
than five million US Dollars ($5,000,000) and which employs
no fewer than 50 permanent Palestinian workers.
2. The Agency's Board of Directors may grant certain projects addi-
tional exemptions depending on the nature of the project and the
needs and development priorities of the Palestinians.
Article 12
The Agency's Board of Directors may grant special exceptional ex-
emptions to export projects, provided that the percentage of output
processed for export is not less than 25 per cent of the total output and
that the value is not less than 30 per cent of the total cost of the pro-
ject. The Board of Directors may also consider granting additional in-
centives for export-oriented agricultural projects.
PART V
Exemption Procedures
Article 13
1. To benefit from the exemptions provided for under this Law, an
investor shall submit an application supported by a technical and
economic feasibility study of the project and shall satisfy all licens-
ing procedures or any other requirements provided for under ap-
plicable laws and regulations.
2. The Agency shall within thirty to sixty days from the date of appli-
cation notify the applicant of its approval or rejection and shall
state the reasons therefor.
3. In the event of the approval of the exemptions, the investor shall
submit an action plan detailing the steps to be followed to com-
plete the project; provided that the project implementation start-
up period shall not exceed six months from the date of approval.
4. The Investor shall submit to the Agency information and data re-
quired concerning the project's implementation and operation.
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The Agency may designate official(s) to conduct field trips to ver-
ify the information presented.
Article 14
The exemption procedures provided for in this Law shall apply to all
areas of investment except the following sectors and areas which re-
quire prior approval of the National Authority:
1. The manufacture and distribution of weapons, ammunition
or their parts;
2. The aviation industries, including airports;
3. The electrical power generation and distribution;
4. The reprocessing of refuse and solid waste;
5. The processing of petroleum and its derivatives; and
6. Telecommunications services, including radio and television.
Article 15
Upon any transfer of ownership, the project shall continue to en-
joy the same exemptions previously granted provided that it continues
to be operated in the same manner by the new owner and who adheres
to provisions of this Law.
Article 16
A project owner who benefits from the provisions of this Law may
sell his exempted fixed assets to another project enjoying the same
privileges under the provisions of this Law, provided that the Agency
approves such a sale, giving priority in the purchase of these assets to
Palestinian investors.
Article 17
The Agency shall publish a list of all approved projects in the Offi-
cial Gazette every six months, giving a brief description of such
projects.
PART VI
Guarantees Against Nationalization
Article 18
1. No investment, irrespective of the investor's nationality, shall be
nationalized, confiscated or expropriated in whole or in part with-
out the investor's consent. No investment shall be subjected to any
such measure except in compliance with a final judgment handed
down by a competent court.
2. Foreign, Arab and expatriate Palestinian investors shall enjoy the
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same rights and privileges as those granted to local Palestinian in-
vestors.
3. Expatriate Palestinian investors, as well as Arab and foreign inves-
tors, shall enjoy the right of permanent residence in accordance
with applicable laws.
4. An investor, having paid the dues provided for under the applica-
ble laws, may repatriate the capital in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Law.
5. Foreign, Arab and expatriate Palestinian investors may repatriate
the capital and profits generated from investments approved
under this Law, after payment of the dues provided for in applica-
ble laws.
PART VII
Suspension and Cancellation
Article 19
1. Should the Agency find an investor, who has been granted a li-
cense, has failed to comply with the provisions of this Law or its
regulations, or if an investor fails to abide by the conditions speci-
fied in the investment license, the Agency shall notify the investor
in writing of its intention to cancel or suspend the licensed exemp-
tions in the future or retroactively.
2. Should the Agency find that the license was granted to the investor
under false pretense, deceit, bribery or forgery or in a manner
contrary to this Law and its regulations, the Agency may revoke
such a license as of the date of its issue. All taxes, duties and other
benefits and privileges granted to the investment shall be deemed
to be payable immediately, with interest accrued from the date of
the license was issued.
3. In either of the two above mentioned occurrences, the investor
may complain within thirty days from the date of notification of
the decision to the President of the Authority whose decision shall
be final.
PART VIII
Setement of Disputs
Article 20
The Palestinian courts shall have the competence and jurisdiction
to resolve all disputes in accordance with applicable Palestinian laws.
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PART IX
General and Final Provisions
Article 21
1. All investments shall be effected in accordance with the license
granted to them, without any discrimination based on sex, race or
religion when employing local staff, procurement or conducting
any activity.
2. An investment may be made in any economic project, provided
that it shall not conflict with public morals, public order, public
security, and environmental protection laws.
Article 22
Any text contrary to the provisions of this Law shall be invalid and
revoked.
Article 23
All competent authorities, within their respective areas ofjurisdic-
tion, shall execute this Law, which shall enter into force from the date
of its issuance and shall be published in the Official Gazette.
Issued in Gaza on April 30, 1995.
Yasser Arafat
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
Palestine Liberation Organization
President of the Palestinian National Authority
